The Kosovo Moment: The United States and the Post-Cold War Balkans by Xhambazi, Visar
Old Dominion University 
ODU Digital Commons 
Graduate Program in International Studies 
Theses & Dissertations Graduate Program in International Studies 
Spring 2018 
The Kosovo Moment: The United States and the Post-Cold War 
Balkans 
Visar Xhambazi 
Old Dominion University, v.xhambazi@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds 
 Part of the International Relations Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Xhambazi, Visar. "The Kosovo Moment: The United States and the Post-Cold War Balkans" (2018). Master 
of Arts (MA), Thesis, International Studies, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/48x7-nf95 
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds/27 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Program in International Studies at ODU 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Program in International Studies Theses & 




THE KOSOVO MOMENT 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE POST-COLD WAR BALKANS 
by 
Visar Xhambazi 
BSc., May 2015, Rochester Institute of Technology  
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of  
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of  
 
 










Simon Serfaty (Director) 
 
Regina Karp (Member) 
 











THE KOSOVO MOMENT 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE POST-COLD WAR BALKANS 
 
Visar Xhambazi 
Old Dominion University, 2018 
Director: Dr. Simon Serfaty 
 
 
This study attempts to assess the importance of the humanitarian intervention in 
Kosovo, the last phase of Yugoslavian agony. It provides a historical background of the 
region in order to better understand the mosaic of ethnic divisions and hatred as well as 
the cultural differences and the rise of nationalism through time. Furthermore, it analyzes 
the events and evaluates the performance of the United States, Europe and 
intergovernmental organizations in preventing genocide, pushing for regime change and 
state-building. The last stage considers the United States role in the Balkans and beyond, 
aiming to provide essential lessons and recommendations on future interventions and 
state-building processes by considering the accomplishments and failures in Kosovo, for 
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“One day the great European war will come out of some damned foolish thing in the Balkans.” 
—Otto von Bismarck, 18881 
The assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Serb nationalist 
on the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in 1914 incited the first Word War, ending a 
century of peace and order. The unresolved legacies of World War I further deepened the 
crisis resulting in another catastrophe, World War II—one of the most destructive and 
inhumane periods in modern history. Five decades after the horrors of World War II, 
Europe was shaken again. The wars in Yugoslavia put the Balkans back on the map of 
Europe and awakened history’s dark memories, an earlier historical logic of territorial 
wars, ethnic homogenization and nationalism.  
The collapse of communism in the fall of 1989 produced the Wind of Change in 
Europe. The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) absorbed most of 
the world’s attention. The West identified Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary as the 
first states in Eastern Europe that could be integrated into its institutions, the European 
Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On the whole, the Balkan 
region was not regarded as important from a political and economic standpoint. During 
the 1980s, Yugoslavia was a crisis in the making, but when it exploded it became a 
priority.  
The end of communism in the former USSR drew many parallels to Yugoslavia in 
that it revealed long-hidden ethnic tensions. Oppressed ethnic minorities demanded 
independence for their subjects. In the late 20th century, violence erupted again. Slobodan 
Milosevic came to power, aiming to strengthen the Serbs at the expense of other 
ethnicities. Kosovo was the key focus of international politics in 1989, but when problems 
started resurfacing in other parts of Yugoslavia, the focus shifted elsewhere. In 1991 and 
1992, four republics out of six declared their independence, with only Serbia and 
                                                 
1 Matthew C. Price, The Wilsonian Persuasion in American Foreign Policy (New York: Cambria Press, 2007), p. 5.   
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Montenegro remaining in the Yugoslav federation. However, the ethnic status of 
minorities was left unresolved. After several inter-ethnic clashes, the war pitted Serbia 
against Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and later Kosovo. Macedonia was the 
only republic to secede peacefully during the war. 
The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia was one of the dominant post-Cold War 
international crises. The wars in Croatia, brutality in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
complicated negotiations that led to the Dayton Agreement following the ethnic 
cleansing in Kosovo, made the region a focal point for the United States foreign policy. 
The conflict in Yugoslavia increased the importance of international intervention. As the 
world was entering a unipolar moment, the US became the critical actor in world politics. 
The conflict in Yugoslavia came at a time of many geo-political concerns. The US and the 
EU were seeking a diplomatic solution until the shocking genocide in Srebrenica 
happened, the wars in Europe since the Holocaust. The genocide followed a late 
intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina and shaped the intervention in Kosovo. 
The first part of this study aims to provide a short description of the Balkan’s 
political history and the construction of ethnic identity. The conflict in Yugoslavia was 
caused by complex historical and political forces. Outside Yugoslavia, it was believed this 
was an ethnic war where different ethnic groups fought for domination. Others believed 
it was about religion. But, the wars in Yugoslavia, to a large extent, have been nationalist 
in character, neither ethnic nor religious. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the ethnic groups 
were closely related and lived in harmony but Religion has been historically an important 
factor to differentiate between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. Thus, history is important to 
understand the origins of divisions, hatred and wars in the region. The failure to 
comprehend the complexity of history, the geography of pain and cultural differences 
cannot produce good policy-making. 
The Kosovo war came at a time when the Westphalian state system was no longer 
an adequate framework for international relations. The Westphalian state system is 
primarily based on legitimacy. The end of the Cold War brought a huge shift in 
international relations and introduced more consensus within the international 
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community over principles of human rights and the rule of law. Sovereignty and 
therefore legitimacy could no longer be automatically conferred on the de facto power 
holder in a country.2 
The intervention in Kosovo was a significant moment in world affairs. It defined 
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention aims at ending 
atrocities, saving lives and halting systemic violence. NATO was confirming its viable 
role in the post-Cold War world. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, many assumed that in 
the absence of the Soviet threat, NATO would disintegrate. Logic dictated that for a 
military alliance to exist, it had to have enemies. Kenneth Waltz wrote in 1993, “NATO’s 
days are not numbered, but its years are.”3 However, NATO’s missions in Yugoslavia 
proved to be a model for cooperation. France, which had withdrawn from NATO’s 
military structure nearly three decades earlier, announced that it would return. Kosovo 
was positive evidence that NATO still mattered and the US led its flambeau. Most 
importantly, Kosovo reinforces the notion that the United States and its allies have a 
special interest in upholding universal liberal values in Europe. Although Kosovo crisis 
came at a time of sharp bipartisan division’s in the US, it is an example of a successful 
humanitarian campaign as well as a rare example of bipartisan consensus between the 
Republicans and Democrats in the US. A democratic president started the war and a 
republican president finished it.  
The Kosovo war caused approximately 12,000 deaths, displaced close to one-
million Kosovo Albanians, another half-million were believed to be internally displaced 
and damaged or destroyed two-thirds of homes.4 The conflict in Kosovo came at a time 
when NATO was celebrating its 50th birthday. NATO’s intervention proved successful, 
Yugoslav forces withdrew from Kosovo and there was finally peace. United Nations 
(UN), 1244 resolution, officially mandated its mission in Kosovo. The West intended to 
                                                 
2 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building, World Order and Governance in the 21st Century (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 2004), p. 97. 
3 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 
76. 
4 Armed Conflicts Reports, Serbia and Montenegro (ex-Yugoslavia) - Kosovo (1998 - first combat deaths), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/02/25/Serbia.pdf. (accessed October 28) 
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transform the poorest region of former Yugoslavia to the Athens of Pericles.5  In February 
2008, Kosovo declared its independence. The newest state in Europe was recognized by 
a number of democratic states but rejected by several major powers, primarily Russia and 
China, on the basis that the independence of Kosovo was a precedent that had future 
implications for secessionist enclaves. 
To understand how Kosovo achieved independence, it is essential to comprehend 
the fragmentation of Yugoslavia, after a failed attempt to negotiate a settlement at 
Rambouillet, France, resulted in NATO’s decision to launch an air campaign in 
Yugoslavia. Moreover, it provides a brief summary of the Yugoslav wars in Slovenia, 
Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina: these are fundamental in understanding the war 
in Kosovo, because the array of events constructed the fate of the intervention, a 
landmark event in the history of international relations. NATO intervened for the first 
time in its history for means other than defense. NATO is based on the principle of 
collective defense, which is enshrined in Article 5. Collective defense means that an attack 
against one ally is considered as an attack against all allies. Launching an actual war 
against a sovereign state jeopardized Western relations with Russia. Such a circumstance 
would have been deemed unthinkable during the Cold War years and its immediate 
aftermath. Moreover, the second part of this study also provides a comparison between 
the US and EU foreign policy. The former is consolidated, the later remains divided. 
The third part of this research describes Kosovo’s post-conflict experience. An 
amalgamation of different intergovernmental organizations by the international 
community was designed to ensure stability and order. Kosovo’s success in achieving 
independence against the preferences of the central government in Belgrade is a unique 
and very rare case that goes against the grain of the international order. With a few 
noteworthy exceptions, most self-determination movements operating outside of the 
colonial context have failed, often causing much loss of life and tragedy in the process. 
                                                 
5 According to Thucydides, Pericles was a general and statesmen and the first citizen of democratic Athens. Under his 
leadership Athenian culture flourished, he transformed Athens from a city state to an empire.  
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The international order tends to privilege territorial stability over the self-determination 
of populations, but the case of Kosovo tells otherwise. 
Since the end of the Cold War, fragile (weak and failed) states have become the 
single most important problem for international order. Fragile states produce instability 
and they create economic recessions, refugee crises, terrorism and conflicts. The case of 
Kosovo is authentic—often described as sui generis by diplomats—and important. Kosovo 
came at a moment when US leadership reached its zenith, making Kosovo a successful 
story of US foreign policy. Thus, it is crucial to consider some lessons from this particular 
moment in history, to better prepare for future humanitarian interventions. Admittedly, 
no historical analogy is precise, but it is the least misleading thing we have. Mark Twain 
reportedly said that history does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme. Trends change, so 
does history. This work narrates the last story of brutality, survival and redemption in 
Europe. It reminds us about the importance of the US and EU partnership and the role of 
NATO to avert future crises, as well as the importance of state-building to maintain peace 
and order in the world. 
Kosovo is a landlocked country surrounded by mountains with no major river 
crossing it. The region was heavily fought for but did not have any commercial 
significance. The closest synonym to fit Kosovo’s description is dichotomy. Kosovo is 
very small, yet very big; not significant, yet very important; not worth fighting for, but a 
recurring cause for wars. The last part of this study considers the problem of fragile states 
in the world. Fragile states among other problems are a major transnational issue, because 
there cannot be a stable world where one part of the planet functions and the other does 
not.  Such states make other states less secure and stable. Today, there are more than 40 
fragile states, comprising approximately two billion people. As such, state-building will 
continue to be a serious issue in the decades to come. 
Ultimately, the disintegration of Yugoslavia is a collection of moments. When Tito 
died in 1980, many expected Yugoslavia to explode and eventually collapse. That was the 
case, but the international community missed the opportunity to initiate state-building, 
early enough to escape the events that followed. As that did not happen throughout the 
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1980s, the country’s economic performance suffered and employment declined and 
opened the Balkan’s Pandora box: nationalism. Another such moment for preventing the 
war in Yugoslavia was missed in 1992, when the international community failed to 
support Milan Panic, the only political rival to Milosevic. Panic gained 34 percent in a 
electoral contest with Milosevic, which was all the more remarkable considering 
Milosevic’s propaganda machine and irregularities during the voting process. Had Panic 
received some support from the West, the outcome of the election might have been 
different and arguably, would have increased significantly the chances of reaching a 
diplomatic solution. But this moment, too, was not grasped and blazed the trail to 
Sarajevo’s genocide. The European failure in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the US 
decision to act without a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate fasted the 
ultimate moment, The Kosovo Moment; the end of Serbian hegemony, the last phase of the 
Yugoslav agony and the return of statehood for the people of Kosovo. 
This study argues that fragile states are the single most important problem for the 
international order in the 21st century; thus, it is vital to keep the US engaged in the world 
in order to ensure peace and stability. It calls for the renewal of the American moment. 
However, before initiating state-building, it is essential to understand the history, culture 
and geography as unique features characterize each country. The Kosovo Moment gave rise 
to an alternative conception of responsibility and is an important case study in 
international relations that reveals important lessons. Kosovo is crucial because it tells 
the account of the last relative success story of state-building. As the 21st century unfolds, 










BALKANS BETWEEN CROSSROADS 
 
EUROPE’S ACHILLES HEEL 
 
“Balkans produce more history than they can consume.” 
—Winston Churchill6 
For centuries the Balkans served as the main bridge between Europe and Asia and 
vice versa. The identity of the Balkans is dominated by its geographical position, shaped 
between the Occident and the Orient and formed between democracy and communism. 
In the Middle Ages, it was a juncture between the Holy Roman Empire and the 
Byzantium Empire. During the Renaissance, it has witnessed a wrestle for dominance 
and control between the Ottoman Empire, Habsburgs and the Russian Empire. After the 
end of World War II, the struggle for influence became sharply contested between the US 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Located in the south-eastern part of 
Europe, the Balkans peninsula was always known for its geostrategic and political 
significance. Besides its geographical name—coming from the Balkan Mountains—the 
peninsula is a derogatory term loaded with negative connotations of violence, savagery 
and primitivism.7  
The Balkan region was populated by the Illyrians before the Greeks and at least a 
thousand years before the Slavs.8 According to most historic accounts, it is believed that 
Albanians are the descendants of Illyrians. For the Serbs, history started in the 7th century, 
when they settled in the Balkans. It is true that Serbs ruled Kosovo for two centuries prior 
to Ottoman invasion, but there is no more continuity between medieval Serbia to modern 
Serbia. After the Battle of Kosovo, the land remained a territory of the Ottoman Empire 
until it was conquered again by Serbian forces in 1912. “The Serbs would say ‘liberated,’ 
but even their own estimates put the Orthodox Serb population at less than 25 percent. 
                                                 
6 Ishaan Tharoor “The Balkan Wars:100 Years Later, a History of Violence,” Time Magazine, October 08, 2012. 
7 Mark Mazower, The Balkans, A Short History (New York: The Modern Library, 2000), introduction. 
8 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), p. 14. 
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The majority population was Albanian, and did not welcome Serb rule, so ‘conquered’ 
seems the right word.”9 
Albanians populated the majority of lands in Albania and Kosovo; parts of 
Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia and Greece. The Albanian language is a distinguished 
Indo-European language and uses the Latin alphabet. Greek is also a distinguished 
language that stands alone in the family of Indo-European languages. In Yugoslavia, the 
official spoken language was called Serbo-Croatian. When Yugoslavia started to 
disintegrate, the language started to be “separated” as well, each nation making their 
own. The Croats now call their language Croatian and use the Latin alphabet portraying 
their historical civilizational connection with the Catholic church and moving away from 
the Orthodox Cyrillic scripture. The Serbs call their language Serbian and have shifted 
from Western Latin script of their Catholic enemies to the Cyrillic script of their Russian 
kinsmen.10 Except Albanian and Greek, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Macedonian, 
Montenegrin, Serbian, Slovenian, belong to the south-Slavic branch. Although they are 
recognized as separate languages, they have more commonalities than differences. The 
south-Slavic languages can be regarded as different dialects rather than different 
languages. One exception is Bulgarian, which has more in common with the Macedonian 
language.  
In the late 15th century, the Ottoman Empire controlled the majority of the Balkan 
peninsula. Unlike their Western counterparts, the Ottomans had a relatively civilized 
rule. Non-Muslims had the right to exercise their religion, however, they had to pay an 
extra tax. During the inquisition, when Jews were expelled from Western Catholic 
monarchies, they found shelter in the Ottoman Empire, but, Muslims remained first class 
citizens. Thus, people saw the opportunity to advance their personal careers and void the 
extra tax. Albanians living in the cities started converting to Islam whereas people in the 
peripheries remained Catholic. In southern Albania, some continued their Orthodox 
                                                 
9 Noel Malcolm, “Is Kosovo Serbia? We ask a Historian,” The Guardian, February 28, 2008, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/26/kosovo.serbia. 
10 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster 
Paperbacks, 1992), p. 64. 
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tradition. At that time, it was not strange to find an Albanian family where one person 
would be Catholic, one Orthodox and one Muslim. The Serbs on the other hand, 
remained monoreligious. With the help of the Ottomans, they restored the Patriarchate 
to Peja, Kosovo, in 1557.11 This is a landmark event in the history of Kosovo. “Had this 
not happened, had the church not been allowed to revive and to preserve ‘Serbdom’ over 
the centuries, the history of Kosovo and the region would doubtless have been very 
different.”12 
Over the long 19th century, which stretched from the French Revolution to the final 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, the political map of the modern Balkans 
emerged. “The French Revolution and the doings of Napoleon opened the eyes of the 
world. The nations knew nothing before and the people thought that kings were gods 
upon the earth and that they were bound to say that whatever they did was well done. 
Through this present change it is more difficult to rule the people.”13 The demise of the 
Ottoman Empire, the emergence of national identity and the spread of world economy, 
pushed people to think about their political identity and how they wanted to interact and 
live with their neighbors. The 19th century gave birth to the notion of nationhood and 
new independent states formed according to the principle of nationality.  
The stem decline of the Ottoman Empire left Albanians unprepared on developing 
their sense of national identity. The rise to the highest ranks in the empire produce 
ambivalent feelings toward it. Unlike their neighbors, Greeks and Serbs, Albanians did 
not establish a national church to nurture a separate nationhood.14 The Ottomans also 
resisted the idea of Albanian education considering them religious brothers, at the same 
time preventing the creation of the Albanian national identity. In 1878 (Treaty of Berlin) 
Serbia expanded southwards. This becomes a threat for the Albanians who fear their 
lands would be carved up by other Balkans states. The Albanians realized that unless 
they organized themselves their lands and future would be in jeopardy. Their first 
                                                 
11 Denis MacShane, Why Kosovo Still Matters (London: Haus Publishing, 2011), p. 17. 
12 Tim Judah, Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.32. 
13 Mark Mazower, The Balkans, A short History (New York: The Modern Library, 2000), p. 80. 
14 Tim Judah, Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.9. 
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reaction was to demand autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. The League of Prizren 
marks the first blow for Albanian nationalism, although this was a defensive action. 
Initially, the League of Prizren was not opposed by the Ottoman Empire but by 1880 
relations had deteriorated as this was seen as a call for an independent Albanian state 
and was eventually crushed by the Empire a year later.15 Albanian nationalism was also 
encouraged by the Austro-Hungarian Empire who perceived the Serbs as a threat to the 
empire.  
After the successful Balkan war campaign against the Ottoman Empire in the First 
Balkan War (1912), the Balkan states turned immediately against each other, marking the 
Second Balkan War (1913). Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro—the Balkan League 
allies—seized Macedonia during the First Balkan War. Bulgaria’s aspirations to annex 
Macedonia sparked resistance which resulted into the Second Balkan War. As a result of 
total war, refugee’s ethnic homogeneity increased drastically. Successor states in the 
Balkans—Serbia in particular—looked back to their medieval past for their national roots. 
The Ottoman victories over Christian forces in the Balkans occurred through the 15th 
century. Yet, it was the “Battle of Kosovo” (1389) which passed into Serbian national 
mythology. Kosovo is one of the greatest Serbian myths, if not the greatest. The Serbs 
have been always historically attached to Kosovo, although ethnic Albanians were 
always the majority. A significant number of Serbs refer to Kosovo as the heart of Serbia, 
Serbia’s Jerusalem and the cradle of Serb civilization. The legend of Serbia’s defeat—the 
Battle of Kosovo—has long occupied a special place in Serbian national memory. It 
became the inspirational link to medieval statehood that guided the Serbian national 
identity. 
The Battle of Kosovo is portrayed by the Serbs as a fight between civilizations: 
Christianity and Islam. In the battle, both the Serbian Prince Lazar and the Ottoman 
Sultan Murad were killed. The Kosovo narrative has evolved into an intricate morality 
play, highlighting themes of martyrdom and heroic self-sacrifice, portraying the Christ-
                                                 
15 Ibid., 34-36. 
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like Prince Lazar who chooses the kingdom of heaven over the earth one and willingly 
martyrs himself on the Kosovo plain.16 Abraham nearly sacrificed his son Isaac with his 
adekah knife to fulfill God’s wish, until an angel interrupted and stopped him at the last 
moment. In this context, Prince Lazar is both Abraham and Isaac and without any 
interruption sacrifices himself so that the Serbian nation will survive. From the Serbian 
perspective, Kosovo is perceived as the foundation of Serbian identity and culture, the 
cradle of Serbian civilization lost from the Ottomans at the end of the 14th century. In the 
late 20th century, the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo were viewed as aggressive interlopers 
in an area that historically belonged to Serbs by ancestral heritage. Even today, 
nationalism and Orthodoxy remains deeply intertwined in Serbia. 
Serbia faced off with the Ottomans in the 19th century and the Austrians in the 
World War I. It stood alone against Hitler in the World War II, as well as Stalin at the end 
of 1950s. A combination of mythologized nationalism, eastern Orthodoxy and 
victimization, constructed a strong cultural belief in Serbia. Many Serbs viewed their 
country as a victim of history, a perspective which created a heroic and xenophobic 
position of their place in the world. The Serbs failed to understand that they were the 
victims of themselves, victims of their own nationalist beliefs.17 
 
                                                 
16 Alexander Greenwalt, “Kosovo Myths: Karadzic, Njegos and the Transformation of Serb Memory” Pace Law Faculty 
Publications (March 2001), p. 49. 
17 Natasa Kandic, “Letter to War Resisters,” War Resister’s International, May 12, 1999, https://www.wri-




Figure 1: Map of the Treaty of Berlin, 1878. 
Source: Map from An Historical Atlas by Robert H. Labberton, E. Elaxton and Co., 1884. 
 
At the congress of Berlin in 1878, because of a weakened Ottoman Empire, the 
Albanian lands were allocated to Serbia and the latter was recognized as an independent 
country. In 1912—the year Albania declared independence—Greece invaded Southern 
Albania, Montenegro invaded the North, whereas Serbia occupied Kosovo. In this period, 
enormous atrocities were committed against the Albanian population. The goal was to 
establish a pure ethnic state without the presence of minorities. A Danish journalist 
reported from Prizren, Kosovo, “The city seems like the Kingdom of Death. They knock 
on the doors of the Albanian houses, take away the men and shoot them immediately.”18 
US Secretary of State Robert Lansing wrote to the British Secretary of State for Foreign 
                                                 
18 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo, A Short History (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), p. 254. 
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Relations Lord Balfour on 18 April 1919 “Gusinje, Plava, Ipek (Peja), Gjakove, Podjour 
and Roshji have been scenes of terrorism and murder by Serbian troops and Serbian 
agents, whose policy appears to be the extermination of the Albanian inhabitants of the 
region.”19 Leon Trotsky, a leading figure of the Russian revolution, was sent as a war 
correspondent to cover the Balkan Wars. In his report, Trotsky tells a shocking story of 
drunken Serbian soldiers torturing two young Albanians,  
“Four soldiers held their bayonets in readiness and in their midst stood two 
young Albanians with their white felt caps (i.e. Plis) on their heads. A 
drunken sergeant was holding a dagger in one hand and a bottle of cognac 
in the other. The sergeant ordered: ‘On your knees!’ (The petrified 
Albanians fell to their knees. ‘To your feet!’ They stood up. This was 
repeated several times. Then the sergeant, threatening and cursing, put the 
dagger to the necks and chests of his victims and forced them to drink some 
cognac and then… he kissed them... Drunk with power, cognac and blood, 
he was having fun, playing with them as a cat would with mice. The same 
gestures and the same psychology behind them. The other three soldiers, 
who were not drunk, stood by and took care that the Albanians did not 
escape or try to resist, so that the sergeant could enjoy his moment of 
rapture. ‘They’re Albanians,’ said one of the soldiers to me dispassionately. 
‘Hell, soon put them out of their misery.”20  
In order to investigate the crimes, the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace formed a special commission which was deployed in 1913. The commission 
concluded that “houses and whole villages reduced to ashes, unarmed and innocent 
populations massacred en masse, incredible acts of violence, pillage and brutality of 
every kind—such were the means which were employed and are still being employed by 
                                                 
19 U.S. Foreign Relations. Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Vol. 12, PPC 184.018/3. 
20 Robert Elsie, “1912 Leo Trotsky: Behind the Curtains of the Balkan Wars,” Albanianhistory, first published in: 
Kievskaya Mysl, Kiev, No. 355, 23 December 1912. Printed in Balkany i balkanskaya voyna, in Leo Trotsky, Sočinenia, vol. 6 
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the Serbo-Montenegrin soldiery, with a view to the entire transformation of the ethnic 
character of regions inhabited exclusively by Albanians.”21 However, the Serb 
colonization successfully managed to change Kosovo’s ethnography. Around 70,000 
Serbs were settled in Kosovo between 1919 and 1928, representing 24 percent of the 
population in 1919. A decade later—in 1928—Serb population consisted of 38 percent.22 
Fearing a big Serbian territory expansion, the European powers prevented its extension 
to the sea. They recognized the independent state of Albania, but Kosovo was left under 
the mercy of Serbia. The Serbian monarchy violated the clauses established by the League 
of Nations which called for the respect and protection of minorities. In Kosovo, the 
Albanian language was suppressed and the Serbian language was imposed on them. The 
regime supported Serbs colonialists with grants to settle in Kosovo in order to increase 
the Serbian population and influence in Kosovo. Moreover, land ownership documents 
were not issued to Kosovo Albanians to manipulate their capital, make their life hard to 
live, pushing them to migrate out of Kosovo. 
The Treaty of Versailles (1918) established the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes comprised of roughly twelve million people.23 This was not a happy union for 
everyone. The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the threat from Italy on the 
west, left Croats and Slovenians with no other choice but to join the South Slav union (i.e. 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia or Jugoslavia) under the leadership of Serbia’s Karadjordje 
dynasty—who previously ruled the Kingdom of Serbia.24 The very foundation of the 
kingdom was built on distrust and suspicion. The Croats and the Slovenes were aware 
that the union was not a movement towards federalization, but a centralized authority 
dominated by Serbs. Moreover, Albanians in Kosovo—being the only non-Slavic 
                                                 
21 Report on the Serbian Invasion of Kosovo during the First Balkan War 1914, International Commission to Inquire into 
the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Division of Intercourse and 
Education, https://archive.org/details/reportofinternat00inteuoft. (accessed October 2, 2017). 
22 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo, A Short History (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), p. 282. 
23 Halford Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A study in the Politics of Reconstruction (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1919), p. 202. 
24 Mark Mazower, The Balkans, A short History (New York: The Modern Library, 2000), p. 110. 
15 
 
ethnicity in the kingdom—were not recognized, their culture was denied and systemic 
violence and discrimination against them was widespread for decades.   
The Kingdom of Yugoslavia lasted until 1941 when it was invaded by Nazi forces. 
During the partition, Croats sided with the Nazis, establishing the fascist Independent 
State of Croatia (NDH) including present day Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and parts 
of Belgrade. Having Nazi support, the Croatian Ustashe—an ultranationalist and terrorist 
organization—committed enormous atrocities, murdering Serbs, Jews and Roma. The 
mass killings committed by the Ustashe would make reconciliation a very hard task to 
achieve after the war.  After Allied victory in the World War II, Yugoslavia was re-
established, this time however, as a republic. The victory of communist partisan forces 
resulted in the abolition of the monarchy, establishing a one-party state by the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia. In 1963, the nation changed its name to the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia consisting of six republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 






Figure 2: Map of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1991.   
Source: What is the former Yugoslavia? United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia. 
 
The new Yugoslavia fulfilled the aspirations of South Slavic intellectuals, but to 
create that state was necessary to cross the fault line of European history and conflicts, 
which divided the Western and the Eastern Roman empires, the Catholic and the 
Orthodox religions, the Latin and the Cyrillic scripts—a fault line running roughly 
between Croatia and Serbia, which had never in their complex histories belonged to the 
same political unit. The bill for this came due after 1941, in a murderous civil war which 
started all over again in 1991.25 Yugoslavia, since the very beginning of its creation was 
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doomed to fail, because it was built on distrust and fear. Only Serbs fought for 
Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia was a Serbian delusion.26 The rest never felt they belonged in the 
union. When the opportunity came, all ethnic groups wrestled for the creation of their 
nation-state.  
As for the ethnic Albanians, particularly in Kosovo, they were heavily 
discriminated and used by foreign powers as they pleased. There was probably no 
national minority in Europe and beyond with a less favorable geopolitical locus. As 
Christopher Hitchens wrote in 1999, “all through the decades of anti-fascism, anti-
Stalinism, anti-colonialism and the battle for self-determination, in which so many 
intellectuals either distinguished or disgraced themselves, there was probably no cause 
with fewer friends that of Kosovar Albanians.”27 A good analogy would be to perceive 
Kosovo as the Ireland of the Balkans. Being invaded and tyrannized for centuries, Kosovo 
has always maintained its culture, language and identity. Similarly, Ireland was occupied 
and fought over by England dozen times; yet, the Irish identity survived. 
 
THE INDISPENSABLE NATION 
 
“Foreign policy is not architecture. In architecture, you make a plan down to the last nut, the 
last bolt, the last stress beam and then you build the thing. Foreign policy, in my view, is more 
like jazz, it is an improvisation on a theme and you change as you go along.”  
—Richard C. Holbrooke, 199828 
The outcome of World War II seated a new world order, based on the 
preponderance of the United States. Horrifying events in the first part of the 20th century 
forced a fundamental reassessment of the role of US role. As Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote, 
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“a combination of the traditional Protestant ethic, of strong American patriotism, of a 
blend of manifest destiny with Wilsonian universalism of Keynesian economic 
neoliberalism, all strongly conditioned by the failure of the 1930s to shape a system of 
collective security” helped define American values.29 Grand strategy is what a country 
does to advance its national security.30 Only the US has the capacity and will to build a 
global order with freedom, prosperity and democracy. 
After the dehumanizing brutality of both World Wars, the Western world 
underwent a process of reconstruction.  The US was determined to transform Europe’s 
collapsed economies into a stable and working democracy accompanied by well-
established institutions and an efficient economy. Institutions, as usually defined, are 
norms, rules and mutual expectations that structure behavior in a given setting.31 
President Truman’s administration wanted to make sure that Germany would never 
threaten Europe again. Another crucial element was that without economic assistance, a 
divided Germany was at risk of falling under Soviet control. These events created a 
favorable environment instituting the Marshall Plan. The program transferred $13 billion 
(around $130 billion in current value) in aid from the US to Western Europe in the years 
from 1948 to 1951.32 
Economic conditions in Europe eased the implementation of the Marshall Plan.33 
The US aimed to gain and maintain a geostrategic partnership in Europe and to rebuild 
the European economy. The US sent material goods to Europe that were of greater value 
than those received. The US gained influence—according to Klaus Knorr “patronal 
leadership”—which we have referred to as hegemony.34 Providing huge resources to 
Europe, Germany in particular and increased European cooperation and trade relations 
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across the Atlantic. Most importantly, the economic prosperity led by the coal and steel 
industries between France and Germany, helped shape the foundations of the European 
Union (EU). Acknowledging the danger coming from the USSR and communist ideology, 
Truman together with its allies established the North Atlantic Alliance, today known as 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Such decisions helped shaped the socio-political 
atmosphere of Europe. NATO successfully managed to contain Soviet aggression and 
played a critical impact on regional stability and security in former Yugoslavia. 
The Marshall Plan brought stability and economic growth in both Europe and the 
US and it turned out to be one of the most successful programs of recent history. The US 
had a profound influence on the economic stability of Europe; ergo, it became the 
producer of security of the post-World War II and post-Cold War eras. The US 
reconstruction of Germany provides important lessons on how societies can be 
encouraged to change into democracies and become more cooperative. The most 
remarkable aspect of the Marshall Plan is that the US gave up its usual demands for 
reciprocity—Marshall Plan aid consisted of grants, not loans.35 
The post-World War II years showed the vision needed to keep America deeply 
engaged in the world and Europe peaceful.36 This engagement came at a cost, a state of 
political hostility between the US and the USSR, characterized by an arms race, threats 
and propaganda. The Cold War split Europe in half—the East and the West—and the 
demarcation line was the Berlin Wall. The fall of empires in the beginning of the 20th 
century followed by the Russian revolution and World War II, established a clash 
between ideologies: democracy (West) and communism (East). Fundamental political 
differences created ideologies that were extremely polarized. Bipolarity between the US 
and the USSR produced a rigid and difficult structure in world affairs. The US followed 
the policy of “containment” to prevent the spread of communism, a policy which proved 
successful worldwide, but failed in some places such as Vietnam, Cuba and Korea.  
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For 45 years, the West lived in fear of the day that the Red Army would march 
across the Elbe river. But by 1990, this army was moving in the opposite direction.37 
Communism failed to provide incentives for workers and citizens to work hard and be 
productive. The absence of markets and inefficiencies in production halted the progress. 
In addition, huge military expenditure living in a repressive environment under 
dictatorship created obstacles to living a normal life. The USSR simply collapsed as a 
consequence of internal contradictions.  
The breakdown of the USSR produced one of the greatest changes in world politics 
since World War II. The international system adjusted from bipolarity to unipolarity and 
the US emerged as the sole surviving superpower. The decline of the Soviet deterrent 
created the incentives to exercise the “unipolar moment.” America’s superior military, 
strong economy, well-established institutions and technological advancement confirmed 
that the US was the only country capable of acting decisively in world affairs. 38 US 
foreign policy proceeded a transformative change and coherent involvement in world 
affairs by means and responsibilities to other nations aiming the general well-being of the 
world.  
The end of the Cold War produced new problems and opportunities for major 
powers. One of the problems was increase of failing states, the opportunity was to gain 
influence for geopolitical reasons. For instance, Yugoslavia is regarded as one of the most 
important geo-strategic regions.  The Balkans has been a fight for dominance between the 
US and the Soviets, but after the end of Cold War, Russia lost its geopolitical capacity. 
The US has shown remarkable patience during the Cold War but did a poor job managing 
the post-Cold War. The Western model of liberal democracy became the model of 
governance for former Yugoslavia and for most post-communist countries in Europe. 
Similar to every European nation, Russia desperately needed a massive support with 
capital investments, liberal education reform and high technology skills, but President 
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George W. H. Bush only wanted to prevent them from starvation. Bush complacency 
produced the modern Carthaginian Peace.39 This indisposition created a quagmire. The 
Russians faced many obstacles and even today they haven’t fully recovered from the 
Soviet wounds. Post-Soviet Russia had an opportunity to reinvent itself, but America 
failed to provide its support for democratic reforms and economic growth and bring 
Russia to the Western liberal order. Thus, American-Russian relations has yet to be 
determined.  
The US presence enforced a general peace and stability in Europe. A region that 
had known constant great power conflict and was influenced by nationalist demons. The 
US decision to stay in the old continent created the incentives of a long-term stability. 
Landmark decisions and events such as: the financial and military aid to Greece and 
Turkey; the Marshall Plan to rebuild the west; the establishment of the United Nations 
(UN) and the European Union to ensure stability; the formation of North Atlantic 
Alliance to provide security, established the so-called “institutional order” which 
triggered a transformation of international relations. Consequently, the US helped 
rebuild Europe, contained the Soviets, toppled communism and liberated Eastern 
Europe. Most importantly, it created the conditions for prosperity and cooperation 
among nations and the pathway to influence world affairs. 
The US is the first major power that is truly universal due to its range of interests, 
including an unprecedented belief and commitment to its values as well as extensive 
emulation of its institutions.40 In order to qualify as a major power, a state must score 
well on certain criteria: size of population and territory; resource endowment; economic 
capabilities; military strength; and competence41 (Joseph Nye would add soft-power to 
the equation42). Such features are not cumulative, if one of them is missing there is an 
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absence of major power. The US is one of the most populated and largest countries in the 
world; however, when it comes to resources, economy, military and competence, the US 
is the paragon of the world. Never in modern international history has a leading state 
been so dominant economically and militarily. The US combination of quantitative and 
qualitative material advantages is unprecedented and it translates into a unique 
geopolitical position.43  
The US ability to play its new role in world affairs created some remarkable 
advantages, putting the US in a historically unique position. The American post-World 
War II strategy would be solely focused on the promotion of a Wilsonian world order 
based on the spread of liberal democracy. As Dean Acheson explained, Americans had 
to learn to “operate in a pattern of responsibility which is greater than their own 
interests.”44 Consequently, the postwar strategy aimed at preventing a general collapse 
of world order focusing on open and free international economy, institution building and 
promoting democracy. This strategy requires enormous energy and a wide set of 
responsibilities in order to respond effectively to international crises and conflicts. 
Committed to these responsibilities, the US has to be vigilant and ready to act with 
diplomacy or force in the world.  
The post-Cold war has been turbulent. It began with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 
followed by civil wars in Somalia, Rwanda and Yugoslavia, to nine-eleven attacks. The 
Gulf crisis (1990-91) and the Yugoslavian crisis (1990-99) were the biggest post-Cold War 
crises. They were critical for world’s stability and economy. This time America was richer 
and more powerful and consequently had more say in managing both conflicts. The 
Persian Gulf and Yugoslavia allowed President George H. W. Bush to project a new 
foreign policy and beyond that a new world order. His policy was clear, punish the 
aggression in order to establish the new world order. A world order describes the concept 
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held by a region or civilization and the distribution of power applicable to the entire 
world.45 America was involved heavily in world affairs and its foreign policy was not 
always successful and as such it suffered significant deterioration. However, any nation’s 
foreign policy is bound to fail more often than it is to succeed. The attempt to influence 
the behavior of people even in the domestic setting is difficult enough. To influence other 
nations without defeating them is the most difficult of all human tasks.46 
History shows that the US has had strong propensity to become involved in wars 
and conflicts. “War is understood as a major armed conflict in which the US has 
committed forces against a sovereign enemy for the purpose of defeating it.”47 The post-
Cold War period was characterized with global military interventions and a bigger 
involvement of the US.  The military campaigns in “Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Haiti, Kosovo, Libya and so on—account for three percent of the casualties 
and ten percent of the costs.”48  In Kosovo, NATO campaign suffered only two fatalities 
throughout the operation and they did not die in direct combat, but during the training 
missions in Albania.  Kosovo also ranked sixth in relative monetary contribution. As 
Steven Pinker observes in his book The Better Angels of our Future, the number of deaths 
from war, ethnic conflict and military coups has declined enormously since 1945 and 
concludes that people has become “socialized” to prefer peace and nonviolence.49 
Although, wars are becoming less frequent, they are becoming more dangerous. The 
persistence of arms race, the dangers of nuclear and conventional weapons proliferation 
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and the absence of safeguards to prevent future conflicts has made the world a dangerous 
place to live in.50   
According to Robert Cooper—year 1989—the fall of the Berlin wall and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union bases the liberal order on the expectations of peaceful 
change, creating a hub of communities between states.51 For Europe, post-Cold War was 
a peaceful time; however, the old demons of ethnic divisions and nationalism that 
resurfaced as the Balkans deteriorated into ethnic and civil conflict, challenged Europe’s 
peaceful atmosphere. After the Cold War, Yugoslavia imploded. The Europeans tried to 
manage the situation on their own, but they could not. The US proved it was the 
indispensable nation for a region that had spent a history of pain, that culminates with 
the US decision to intervene in Kosovo in the aftermath of a European failure in Bosnia. 
 
BALKANIZATION OF THE BALKANS 
 
“The only truth in the Yugoslav war is the lie.” 
—Misha Glenny, 199252  
Since the very establishment of Yugoslavia, two distinct nationalist policies have 
struggled for primacy regarding Yugoslavia’s political future: Croatian separatism or 
Serbian centralism. Ethnocentric and national ideology proved difficult in forming a 
unitary Yugoslav state. Bosnia and Herzegovina posed the biggest challenge, because 
both Serbs and Croats lived there in large numbers and both of them had historical 
territorial claims.53 Under the leadership of Marshall Josip Broz Tito—a Croat and the 
first president of Yugoslavia—Yugoslavia became a founding member of the non-aligned 
movement, known as the doctrine of ‘positive neutralism’ (Bandung Conference 1955), 
pursuing a non-aligned policy and maintaining good relations with both the East and 
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West. Non-alignment is not the same as neutrality. Non-alignment basically means being 
part of world affairs by picking sides depending on your national interest. Neutrality 
however, works only for small states such as Switzerland and Austria, countries that do 
not have a big impact in the world’s political stage. Although authoritarian in his regime, 
Tito under the motto “brotherhood and unity” managed to maintain the coexistence of 
the citizens in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was a socialist in content but national in form. Tito 
wanted to confer a sense of statehood under Yugoslav identity. There have always been 
ethnic tensions, but Tito kept it under control and suppressed nationalism.  
The aftermath of World War II was a tragic period for ethnic Albanians. Yugoslav 
communists initiated movements to suppress Albanian nationalism, which they saw as a 
direct threat to Yugoslavia. The Kosovo communist government became the proxy for 
Belgrade. Furthermore, by challenging Stalin’s authority, Tito started getting closer to the 
West. In return, the US turned a blind eye as Tito’s regime executed Albanians accused 
of collaborating with Germany and Italy.54 A century of separation had created two 
different Albanian realities—one in Communist Albania and the other in Kosovo 
Yugoslavia. Kosovo Albanians demanded freedom and rights, specifically they 
demanded to be given the full status of a republic, within Yugoslavia. In 1974, the 
Yugoslav constitution gave Kosovo and Vojvodina (Northern Serbia, populated 
significantly by ethnic Hungarians) several prerogatives as the six republics, except the 
right to secede. Even though the term republic was not mentioned, Kosovo had all the 
functions of a republic and held the right of veto at the federal level, except one.55 
According to the constitution of Yugoslavia, only the republics had the right to self-
determination, including the right to secede. Thus, the distinction was very important. 
These developments created political tensions. Serbs opposed the new constitution 
arguing that the new amendments divided Serbia into three parts. They saw the 
constitution as an anti-Serbian attempt to undercut their influence and power in the 
                                                 
54 David L. Phillips, Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention (Cambridge: The Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Press, 2012), p. 13. 
55 Ibid., 14. 
26 
 
meantime strengthen Yugoslavia at the expense of Serbia. When Tito died, political 
tensions arose and economic performance declined. In 1981, ethnic Albanians of Kosovo 
began protesting requiring for a republic status within Yugoslavia. This time thousands 
of students mobilized demanding freedom. Protests spread all over the country. The 
metal workers of Trepca mines in Mitrovica joined the protest. Adem Demaci—a notable 
Albanian activist and a freedom fighter—became the symbol of protest, often described 
as the “Mandela of Balkans” having spent 28 years in Yugoslav prison. The Yugoslav 
police responded with violence and hundreds of people were imprisoned. The death of 
President Tito in 1980 is largely viewed as the beginning of the Yugoslav collapse. 
Serb hard-liner’s main interpretation of the “Serbian tragedy” in Kosovo was that 
ethnic Albanians had gained control through Yugoslavia's 1974 constitution and that the 
only way to stop the “ethnic cleansing” of Serbs in Kosovo was to reinstate Serbian 
domination there. In the ambiguity surrounding the “Kosovo problem,” hard-liners 
organized a putsch in Serbia's Communist party in 1987, bringing the most conservative 
elements into the party's leadership positions.56 Kosovo Serbs complained of “cultural 
genocide” accusing Albanians of murder, rape, desecration of burial grounds and holy 
sites. When a Serb nationalist Slobodan Milosevic came to power in 1989, Kosovo 
Albanians demand for a republic status was out of the question. Milosevic initiated 
draconian measures under the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” conveying more power 
and control for himself. Slovenia and Croatia called for more autonomy for individual 
republics, whereas Serbia for more unity and centralization. 
Kosovo was the epicenter of Milosevic’s political platform. He saw a potential in 
grasping nationalism to put himself in power. Kosovo was the strategic center to restore 
Serbia’s pride and glory and to engineer Milosevic’s rise to power. In April 1987, 
Milosevic was sent to Kosovo by Ivan Stambolic, the President of Serbia, to listen to the 
complaints of Kosovo Serbs, a period when ethnic tensions were high. Thousands of 
Serbs gathered in his rally chanting his name. A fight ensued when local police comprised 
                                                 




of Kosovo Albanians tried to disperse the crowd. The incident was staged, Milosevic had 
already been in Kosovo days before to set up the event.57 Milosevic responded: “they will 
never do this to you again. No one will ever have the right to beat you.”58 In an attempt 
to topple his mentor, Ivan Stambolic, he exploited the strong anti-Albanian sentiment 
among Kosovo Serbs by making Kosovo his top priority political agenda. As such, he 
discredited the reputation of Stambolic. Milosevic’s political tactic to call for “justice” for 
the Serb minority in Kosovo, left other republics with only two alternatives: accept 
Serbian unitarian dominance or respond through nationalism and self-determination. In 
reality, Kosovo Serbs were the victims of their perception of Albanians as terrorists, 
prolonged by Milosevic’s regime as an instrument to justify his repressive actions.  
The truth is that Serbs living in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia did not really 
had great sympathy for the Serbs in Kosovo.59 So, why did Milosevic’s rhetoric on Kosovo 
proved successful? Through invoking Serbian ancient obsession with Kosovo, Milosevic 
was able to send a strong signal and gain significant sympathy among Serb nationalists. 
Kosovo attracted religious leaders as well and in Serbia religion and nationalism go hand 
in hand. When ethnic Serbs protested in various regions, asking for “justice” and “human 
rights” they waved the Serbian flag and Orthodox iconographies. For many Serbs, 
Milosevic was the reincarnation of Prince Lazar and the only leader who would unite all 
Serbs under one nation. If Prince Lazar chose the kingdom of heaven, Milosevic chose the 
kingdom of earth. His “Prince Lazar” appearance was the apotheosis of his career.  
Milosevic’s political agenda was a combination of nationalism, religion and 
intimidation. He paid people to organize and participate in protests around the country 
and intimidate non-Serb peoples of Yugoslavia in order to implant the idea that Serb 
citizens were at large being discriminated against.60 The protests reached its apex in June 
1989 in Gazimestan (East Kosovo) to celebrate the 600th anniversary of the Battle of 
Kosovo, otherwise known as “Vidovdan,” Serbia’s most important national holiday. 
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During his speech, Milosevic stated, “look with what ease I can mobilize over one million 
Serbs.”61 Because Vidovdan was an official state holiday, prominent Yugoslav leaders 
attended the celebration. Milosevic said those words in front of Slovene Janez Drnovsek, 
the state President and the Croat Ante Markovic, the Prime Minister. From this moment, 
Milosevic unleashed the virus of ethno-nationalism that would bring only one outcome, 
the death of a nation and Serbia’s disgrace. The end of Yugoslavia began in Kosovo. 
Milosevic began to reassert Serb control in Kosovo and Vojvodina. In 1989, 
Kosovo’s autonomy was abolished and martial law was declared. The Serbian assembly 
also amended the constitution of Serbia, removing the word “Socialist” from the official 
title and established a multi-party system. Further, they removed the independence of 
institutions of the autonomous provinces such as Kosovo and renamed Kosovo as the 
Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija.” Metohija was added to preserve the 
nationalism in Serbia. During the fall of the Serbian Empire, the Brankovic family held 
parts of the region of “Metohija” (Western Kosovo), a term which in Serbian means 
“monastic estates.” However, Kosovo was not abolished as a province. Having full 
control on four members (Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo), Milosevic needed 
just one more in order to be the ruler of Yugoslavia. These decisions created a chain of 
cataclysmic events. A wave of ethnic discrimination and systematic violence went 
underway. The regime intensified its repression of the Albanian population in Kosovo, 
including depriving their most fundamental basic rights, destroying their educational 
system and high numbers of political dismissals of civil servants.62 It became clear to 
other republics that Milosevic was not interested in fighting for Yugoslavia, but rather 
for a greater Serbia that would allow all ethnic Serbs to live in one nation. It was obvious 
that Yugoslav days were counted and it was too late to save it. Yugoslavia became a 
vehicle for Serbian dominance which in turn stimulated national opposition from other 
ethnic groups. 
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The former Yugoslavia had disintegrated into four ethnic groups fighting for 
domination: Croats, Serbs, Bosniaks and Albanians. Croats are majority Roman Catholic, 
Serbs Christian Orthodox together with Montenegrins and Macedonians, Bosniaks are 
Muslims, whereas Albanians belong to the three religions. Although this was not a 
religious war, religion was one of the main factors used to distinguish these communities 
in terms of their culture. An exception can be made for the Albanians who belong to the 
three above-mentioned religious affiliations. An Albanian Catholic writer and Ottoman 
Governor of Lebanon, Pashko Vasa wrote in the 19th century, “the religion of Albanians 
is Albanianism.”63 In Albanian, this phrase quoted to interpret the secular identity of 
Albanians. On the other hand, the core identity of Serbian identity lies in the Serbian 
Orthodox Church. To be a Croat means having a Catholic background. The Bosniak 
identity is solely framed by the Muslim identity. All ethnicities speak relatively the same 
language, the main difference is that Croats and Bosniaks use the Latin alphabet whereas 
Serbs the Cyrillic one. Only Albanians speak a non-Slavic language. 
During the 14th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the Slovenes 
and Croats attempted “save Yugoslavia” by delegating more power to the six republics, 
calling for more decentralization. Their motions were continuously rejected, because 
Milosevic did not want to accept the transformation of Yugoslavia in sovereign states and 
weaken his position. The Croatian and Slovenian delegation then left the Congress, which 
came out to be the last one. After the failed attempt to reach a consensus, the six republics 
adopted a multi-party system, where nationalists won overwhelmingly. In Croatia, 
Franjo Tudjman introduced constitutional changes pushing for independence. Milosevic 
publicly stated that Croatia can go, but not the territories where Serbs live. For Croats this 
was unacceptable. Tudjman and Milosevic could have avoided the war in the Balkans, if 
and only if, Tudjman was more willing to negotiate with Serb minority in Croatia and 
Milosevic showed incentives to decentralize the federation. Milosevic wanted to keep 
both, centralization and federalism, but that was not possible. 
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Political tensions between Serbs and Croats intensified. The international 
community shifted attention away from Kosovo. Local Serbs protested immensely 
Tudjman’s constitutional changes. The Serb boycott in Croatia escalated into an 
insurgence in majority Serb populated areas, mostly around Knin. The conflict between 
Zagreb and Knin provoked the war. In the next couple of days, ethnic tensions and 
propaganda rose enormously. On May 1991, the first armed clashes between Croatian 
police and Serb paramilitaries occurred and an independence referendum was held, 
which was boycotted by Croatian Serbs. Both Croatia and Slovenia declared 
independence on the same day, 25 June 1991. This sparked a military conflict in Slovenia 
which came to be known as the “Ten Day War.” The EU rushed to call representatives of 
Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia at the bargaining table and stop the war. Yugoslav state 
effectively capitulated to Slovenia by signing the Brioni Accord.64 The agreement 
acknowledged Slovenian liberation, stipulated the withdrawal of all Yugoslav army units 
and brought an end to the conflict in Slovenia. Croatia was part of the negotiations, but 
the Croatian issue was left entirely open. Milosevic failed to understand that it was hard 
to justify a war in Croatia in the name of Yugoslavia once Slovenia was not part of it. 
The Yugoslav army—under the directives of Milosevic—sent tanks and armored 
vehicles to fight Slovenia; however, they never made it as the agreement was signed and 
because Milosevic’s interest was Croatia, where he was determined to “save and protect” 
more than half million of Serbs living there. The outcome was a brutal inter-ethnic conflict 
which started in Croatia and followed in Bosnia and Herzegovina producing fatal 
consequences. The conflict between Croats and Serbs pushed Bosnia into the abyss. Both 
Croats and Serbs wanted to divide Bosnia in ethnic lines, without taking into 
consideration more than 40 percent of the Bosniaks living there. Bosniaks were 
imprisoned, tortured, raped and murdered. Serb forces built concentration camps where 
Bosniaks were imprisoned in—scenes comparable to World War II.  Images of devastated 
Bosniaks circulated around the world. The process of the breakup of Yugoslavia gave a 
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new meaning to the old notion of Balkanization. Bosnia and Herzegovina was propably 
the only republic that reflected the true identity of Yugoslavia, consisting of a 
heterogenous society, communal life and home of three religions. 
In Serbia, Milosevic had to cross one more challenge to fully consolidate his power. 
Milan Panic the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia decided to run for President of Serbia in 
1992 against Milosevic. Panic was the opposite of Milosevic, he campaigned for 
democracy and peace. He was the first American citizen to occupy a high-level political 
position in a foreign country since Golda Meir. In order to win against Panic, Milosevic 
mobilized his nationalist base and used the media to portray Panic as a Western puppet 
and an unscrupulous opportunist. Moreover, the U.S. statements to prosecute war 
criminals including Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic designed Milosevic’s election 
victory. Panic gained only 34 percent against Milosevic, even though according to some 
estimates, five percent to ten percent of the election results were rigged.65 Milosevic’s 
conspiracy proved effective and the US helped shape his conspiracy story. Had the US 
showed public support for Panic and not focus on Serbian generals, the outcome might 
have been different, or at least made the elections a narrow margin victory for Milosevic. 
Still, the outcome was an impressive result that reiterated the widespread opposition 
against Milosevic. 
Although the collapse of Communist Party rule in Eastern Europe had full 
American support, President Bush took a different stance on Yugoslavia. The Bush 
administration went so far as to criticize those who were challenging the old order. 
Visiting Belgrade in June 1991, Secretary Baker warned separatist leaders that 
Washington was not on their side.66 This was perceived by Milosevic as a green light to 
oppose separatist movements. The UN ordered sanctions against Serbia, but without an 
American commitment to the use of force the UN was incapable of pressuring Serbia to 
prevent the violence. Sanctions did not have a desired impact. Instead, “they had 
strengthened Milosevic’s position, further weakened the Serbian opposition and made 
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life miserable for those Serbs who are not responsible for the carnage.”67 The first reaction 
from the US came in 1992. President George H. W. Bush condemned the Serbian actions 
and threatened with military action, “in an event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian 
action, the US will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbians in Kosovo 
and in Serbia proper.”68 This threat was later known as the “Christmas warning.”69 Bush 
administration was dealing with the situation in Croatia and Bosnia; thus, they did not 
want the conflict to spread in Kosovo. The warning came at the end of the Bush 
presidency; however, the warning was reiterated by the Clinton administration within a 
month of taking office in 1993, when the new US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, 
stated, “we remain prepared to respond against the Serbians in the event of conflict in 
Kosovo caused by Serb action.”70 The warning had an effect in delaying the war in 
Kosovo, however the conflict would eventually recommence.  
The Serbian regime doubted that either the UN or the US would act and that was 
true in the beginning. Yugoslavia was unappealing for the Bush administration to get 
involved in for several reasons: it had little economic significance; it was small in terms 
of geopolitical importance; and it was a European problem.71 The Europeans on the other 
hand, were more focused on managing the problem rather than solving it. From the 
European standpoint, the crisis in Yugoslavia was a human rights problem rather than a 
fight against a brutal regime and a struggle for self-determination. 
Two years later, when President Bill Clinton took office, he had articulated three 
policy goals: (1) modernizing the military, (2) developing the economy and (3) promoting 
democracy. Arguably Clinton’s three policy goals were more foreign rather than 
domestic, nevertheless President Clinton emphasized his focus on domestic affairs. The 
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post-Cold War world produced several foreign policy crises which challenged Clinton's 
abilities as a statesman. The failure to act in Rwanda and the late intervention in Bosnia 
prepared him to define his foreign policy goals, “leadership and intervention quickly 
replaced incoherence, indecisiveness and inaction.”72 The US approach in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was awkward in the beginning. President Clinton threatened air strikes 
against Bosnian Serbs, yet at the same time, he favored the Bosniaks by providing them 
with arms and persuaded the Croats to make an alliance with them in order to fight the 
Bosnian Serbs. Later he stated, “the US is not and should not, become involved as a 
partisan in a war.” Next, he declared “the US should lead other Western nations in order 
to end the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.” Afterwards, President Clinton said, “that does not 
mean that the US or the UN can enter a war, in effect, to redraw lines…within what was 
Yugoslavia.”73 This overwhelmingly confused policy inevitably produced fatal 
consequences and cost thousands of lives on all sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
UN—under Security Resolutions 819 and 824—established humanitarian 
corridors in 1993, otherwise known as the “safe areas.” The territories were put under the 
protection of the UN peacekeeping units. The safe areas were hard to implement because 
the country was at war. The UN peacekeeping troops were small and struggled on whom 
to protect. By 1995 the situation in the safe areas was deteriorating and it culminated with 
a turning point. In July, Europe witnessed the largest post-genocide in Srebrenica since 
the Holocaust. The Serb army slaughtered 8,373 men and boys. The Western media 
extensively covered the slaughter, questioning seriously Washington’s and NATO’s 
credibility. In August, NATO launched an air campaign against Bosnian Serb forces 
which brought them to the negotiation table. The use of force to catalyze diplomacy set 
an important precedent for what would happen latter in Kosovo.74 
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Clinton changed course from his predecessor. In his first National Security Council 
meeting, President Clinton told his advisers the conflict could not simply be left to the 
Europeans, the US had to get involved or “nothing will happen.”75 Moved by Serbian 
atrocities, he pushed NATO to begin bombing Bosnian Serb military positions. In 
October, a ceasefire was announced. After several years of fighting and hostility, an 
agreement was made called the Dayton accords mediated by the special envoy and US 
Assistant Secretary of State, Richard C. Holbrooke. In three weeks, Holbrooke managed 
to stop the war and reached a peaceful divided state, but not a peaceful united one. 
Kosovo was not even mentioned in the negotiations. In fact, it was Holbrooke who agreed 
to Radovan Karadzic’s—a Serbian general and war criminal—demand to exclude Kosovo 
from the agreement.76 Moreover, Milosevic’s cooperation was crucial to finalize the 
agreement. This weakened Holbrooke’s leverage in exacting the concessions that would 
have been crucial for progress in Kosovo.77 This left a big question unanswered. Kosovo 
Serbs believed Milosevic abandoned Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. They 
thought they could be next. Kosovo Albanians on the other hand felt betrayed. For them, 
the international community was not concerned about the situation in Kosovo. Both 
Americans and Europeans believed they could bargain with Milosevic and that Dayton 
settlement would stop the conflicts of Yugoslavia. The bill came a couple of years later. 
The death of Yugoslavia would not have been possible without the malevolent 
personality of Milosevic. He was a paradoxical dictator, with no real passion or affection 
for his people. He started as a communist and shifted to nationalism overnight. Milosevic 
was a man of pure ego, a man who advocated the false promise of “greater Serbia” and 
unleashed violence in a pathologically unstable region. His leadership brought 
devastating consequences for all ethnicities and ended the lives of tens of thousands of 
people. 
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THE BATTLE FOR KOSOVO 
 
COERCIVE DIPLOMACY AND LIMITED WAR 
 
“We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no 
longer get away with doing in Bosnia.”  
—Madeleine Albright, 199878  
In reaction to Milosevic’s constitutional reforms, Kosovo Albanians gathered in 
Kacanik (Southern Kosovo) to proclaim the “Republic of Kosovo” and adopted the 
“Kacanik Constitution.” The declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 
sparked a euphoria in Kosovo. The Kosovar parliament approved the “Resolution on 
Independence and Sovereignty of Kosovo” in September. The resolution was defined as 
illegal by Yugoslav authorities. A month later, the Kosovo parliament declared the 
independence of Kosovo and was recognized only by Albania. The Democratic League 
of Kosovo (LDK) won the majority of seats and Ibrahim Rugova (the head of LDK) was 
elected President of Kosovo.  
Rugova became the leading figure to oppose the Serbian oppression. He was a 
literary critic, journalist, writer and a polyglot who spoke Albanian, Serbo-Croatian, 
French and English. His ideology was simple: advocate a peaceful resistance against the 
oppressor. People in Kosovo and beyond started referring to him as the “Gandhi of the 
Balkans.” Rugova’s strategy of passive resistance in keeping Kosovo quiet during the war 
in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina attracted widespread support among 
Kosovo Albanians. He believed in the tradition of endurance and the culture of solidarity. 
He understood Kosovo was not prepared to fight the Serbian aggression and if things 
would escalate the outcome would be terrible. He rejected a proposal by the Croatian 
President Franjo Tudjman to open a second war front in Kosovo. Also, having the 
                                                 




“Christmas Warning” as the American guarantee for protection of his countrymen, 
Rugova continued his peaceful resistance.  
However, Dayton Agreement’s failure to mention Kosovo weakened Rugova’s 
peaceful approach. It was indeed true that Rugova’s peaceful tactic was not rewarded by 
either Milosevic nor Europe. The West encouraged the nonviolent approach, but nothing 
more. The Kosovo Albanians, saw that Bosniaks, Croats, Slovenes and Macedonians had 
all left Yugoslavia to form independent states. They shared the same ambition; however, 
the Dayton Agreement did nothing for them. In his seminal peace, The Balkans 1804-1999 
Misha Glenny writes, “the Kosovo Albanians looked northwards to Croatia and Bosnia 
with envy. They observed that with the help of the international community, the Serbs 
had been defeated completely in the former and partially the latter. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the international community had pledged $5 billion to aid reconstruction. 
Despite being Milosevic’s first victim, the Kosovo Albanians had received nothing. As 
long as they remained passive, the more radical Albanians reasoned, the outside world 
would ignore them, the Milosevic regime could continue to deny Albanian rights and his 
shabby regime of repression would continue.”79 Fearing of being neglected, Kosovo 
Albanians began to advocate for an armed uprising under the umbrella of the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA). Presumably, the Kosovars could relate to the 1978 Camp David 
Accords between Egypt and Israel, which did not extend the principle to self-
determination for the Palestinians; but rather, supported the idea that “representatives of 
the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the 
Palestinian problem in all its aspects.”80 Moreover, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
collapse of communism in Albania had a significant impact among Kosovo Albanians. 
The end of the regime in Albania had created a euphoria that unification was now 
possible. But the reality in Albania was quite different. Albanians of Albania did not share 
the same sense of proudness and patriotism as Kosovo Albanians. Devastated from 
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decades of brutal dictatorial regime, Enver Hoxha, the communist head of state, 
produced a miserable life that seriously damaged the national identity and consciousness 
of its people.  
 The KLA began carrying out attacks against Serbian security forces. The KLA was 
aware that they did not have enough forces and armory to confront the Yugoslav forces, 
however, their aim was to launch an armed uprising believing that their actions would 
show the Serbian authorities true face and push for the West to intervene. The US and 
EU had long been concerned about the situation in Kosovo but did not have a lot of 
interest in the region after the Dayton agreement was reached. However, the emergence 
of KLA brought Kosovo back to the table.81 After several attacks on the Serbian police, 
the KLA made their first public appearance in November 1996. KLA attacks continued 
and intensified through 1998. In Belgrade, during a press conference, Robert Gelbard—
the US Special Representative of the President and Secretary of State for Implementation 
of the Dayton Peace Agreement—called the KLA terrorists even though the US had not 
formally designated the KLA as a terrorist organization. The US State Department was 
caught by surprise to Gelbard’s comments.82 
The KLA asserted they would protect ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and target the 
Serbian police, not civilians. According to Tim Judah, “the KLA has to rank as one of the 
most successful military organizations in history. Its success has nothing to do with its 
military prowess; it won no battles. It is, rather, thanks to the fact that emerging on the 
scene at the right place, at the right time, it was able to have NATO win its war for it.”83 
One of the most prominent guerrilla fighters was undoubtedly Adem Jashari, a man 
responsible for several attacks against the regime since 1991. In response to the KLA 
attacks and having a “sort of a green light” from Gelbard’s comments to fight “terrorists,” 
the Serbian police launched a brutal attack on his village on 05 March 1998, killing 58 
people, including 28 women and children. The only person who survived the attack was 
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a young girl. The Serbian government justified the action claiming that Jashari family 
used hostages as human shields and considered the attack as necessary in order to bring 
down terrorists and maintain the rule of law and order. 
The former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright writes in her biography that 
her opinion about the KLA varied, 
“My own view of the KLA fighters were mixed. I sympathized with their 
opposition to Milosevic, understood their desire for independence and 
accepted that force was sometimes necessary for a just cause to prevail. On 
the other hand, there did not appear to be much Jeffersonian thinking 
within the KLA. Often indiscriminate in their attacks they seemed intent on 
provoking a massive Serb response so that international intervention would 
be unavoidable. I wanted to stop Milosevic from marauding through 
Kosovo, but I did not want that determination exploited by the KLA for 
purposes we opposed. We therefore took pains to insist that we would not 
operate as the KLA’s air force or reduce the KLA if it got into trouble as a 
result of its own actions. We condemned violence by either side.”84 
From the Albanian perspective, the Croats, Bosniaks, Serbs, Slovenes, 
Montenegrins and Macedonians are similar people, the only big difference they see is 
religion. So, if they treated each other in such a brutal way, it was unthinkable how much 
worse they could treat the only non-Slavic people of Yugoslavia. The Albanians decided 
to resist at all costs. The Serbian response was violently indiscriminate. Milosevic’s 
strategy was employing Mao’s—Chinese communist leader--favorite tactic, “draining the 
sea in which the fish swam.”85 In the case of Kosovo, this meant attacking and emptying 
entire villages in order to isolate KLA fighters. Using Gestapo-like tactics, the Serbs 
slashed and burned Albanian villages. Gang rapes, home invasions and crop and 
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storefront burnings were the Serbians’ tactics for eradicating Kosovo’s Albanians.86 Some 
people were killed because they could not produce enough cash to save their lives. In one 
case, a two-year old had his arm amputated because the child’s parents had no more cash 
to give to the Serb soldier.87 Looting and widespread destruction of property was 
commonplace. According to some reports Serb forces were sometimes guided to the 
homes of wealthy Kosovo Albanians by local Serb officials. Women were forced to see 
their children and husbands be killed, many were raped afterwards. Kosovo Albanians 
were forced to digging mass graves for their family members and neighbors. They were 
also used as human shields around Yugoslav armory.88 This was unquestionably an 
ethnic-cleansing campaign committed by Serb forces (military and police) and 
paramilitaries for the purpose of eradicating the Albanians.  
Rugova wrongly sensed that Kosovo’s moment was approaching. He attempted 
one more time to continue his peaceful resistance towards self-determination by offering 
direct negotiations with Milosevic. He dismissed his pre-condition of Kosovo recognition 
on the expense that Albanian schools would be available again. Milosevic agreed but 
defected and the Serb regime continued to beat up Kosovo Albanian students who 
demanded their right to education. 
Kosovo did not have an army and the KLA was a lightly armed guerrilla force. 
They were limited in numbers as well as guns. Albanian diaspora—mainly in Austria, 
Germany, Switzerland, US and United Kingdom (UK)—played an important role in 
advocating for their cause. The Kosovo diaspora contributed hundreds of millions 
through the Three Percent Fund and the Homeland Calling Fund to support the national 
struggle and arm the KLA.89 Smuggling weapons was very difficult, but something 
happened at that time which changed the course of events dramatically. Albania, was 
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going through a tough post-Communist transition in the 1990’s and its pyramid 
investment scheme collapsed and plunged the nation into turmoil. Angry people 
demanded their money back bringing the country to a verge of a civil war. The Albanian 
army abandoned state armories, which were eventually looted by civilians. Massive 
amounts of weapons became available overnight, Kosovo Albanians used this 
opportunity to smuggle weapons into Kosovo.90 The KLA did not comprise only from 
Kosovo Albanians. Although majority were from Kosovo, ethnic Albanians from 
Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia were part of the formations. There were also 
people form the diaspora such as the Atlantic Brigade created by Albanian Americans, 
part of which were the Bytyqi brothers who were killed in an attempt to help a Roma 
family move to Serbia after the war. The brothers were stopped by the Serbian police and 
held in custody for entering the country without a visa. That was the last time they were 
seen alive, until they were discovered in a mass grave in Serbia.91 The failure of Serb 
authorities to bring the perpetrators to justice remains a problem for US-Serbia relations. 
In the US, no one was more instrumental on mobilizing the diaspora than 
Congressman Joseph J. DioGuardi, a first-generation Albanian immigrant from South 
Italy. DioGuardi introduced “the first congressional resolution condemning Serbian 
human rights abuses in Kosovo. Senator Bob Dole introduced the same bill in the US 
Senate, putting Albanian concerns on the map.”92 In September 1988, DioGuardi together 
with a group of Albanian Americans met Tom Lantos. Tom Lantos was originally from 
Hungary and the first Holocaust survivor elected to the US Congress. Lantos proposed a 
resolution in the House of the Representatives to support self-determination for Kosovo. 
Moreover, Senator Eliot Engel became more active, calling the US to become more 
involved in Kosovo. 
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The Serb police attacks on the Kosovo villages and the massacre of the Jashari 
family pushed the UNSC to react and adopt a resolution. Resolution 1160 condemned the 
use excessive force by Serbian police against peaceful demonstrators and called for 
immediate necessary steps to achieve a political solution.93 Gelbard met again with 
Milosevic. He showed him photographs and media reports comparing him with Saddam 
Hussein.94 Gelbard’s relationship with Milosevic deteriorated. Kosovo Albanians on the 
other hand, did not like him either because of calling KLA a terrorist group. As a result, 
Gelbard was not seen as a good alternative to negotiate with both parties anymore. US 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright put Richard Holbrooke in charge of Kosovo. Two 
years after leaving Washington as the US Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, Richard 
Holbrooke was promoting his book about the Dayton Accords titled To End a War. A year 
after, he returned to the Balkans to present Milosevic with an ultimatum on Kosovo.  
The KLA became more active on their actions and visible interacting with Kosovo 
Albanians. They started gaining territories and putting up roadblocks. By 1998 they 
controlled 40 percent of Kosovo’s territory.95 In the US, a scandal broke up. Monica 
Lewinsky—a former intern at the White House—admitted to having an “inappropriate 
relationship” with President Clinton. The next day, Al-Qaeda attacked the US embassies 
in Kenya and Tanzania, killing more than two hundred people. The House of the 
Representatives voted for an open-ended impeachment inquiry. One month before the 
scandal, a recent film with Robert De Niro was released, in which the US president attacks 
Albania in order to distract public attention from a domestic scandal. The American 
citizens could draw comparisons, regardless if it was true or not. In the middle of this 
chaos, it seemed that this was the end of Clinton’s Presidential career. 
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The Serbian regime used this opportunity to intensify their violent actions in 
Kosovo. Fearful of having a humanitarian catastrophe during the winter, the British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair proposed Resolution 1199 demanding that Yugoslavia inter 
alia “cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population” and referring 
to possible “further action” if demands are not accomplished.96 Additionally, a month 
later another resolution was adopted. Resolution 1203 demanded compliance with 
several provisions, including NATO Air Verification Mission over Kosovo, accepting 
direct interest on the Kosovo situation.97 This was a direct threat to force Milosevic to 
retreat from its brutal and extreme actions. The outcome of the resolutions was an 
agreement brokered by US Balkan envoy Richard Holbrooke. In October 1998, Milosevic 
agreed to partially withdraw some forces and accepted the terms for NATO aerial 
verification and the deployment of 2,000 unarmed Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitors called the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM).98 
Ambassador William Walker—a US diplomat—was assigned to oversee the KVM. The 
mission’s presence did decrease the level of violence to some extent, but they were 
unarmed and small in numbers; thus, their actions were limited. To both sides—Serbs 
and Albanians—it seemed that the international community was interested on 
preventing a possible conflict rather than solving it.  
Despite the mission’s efforts, the security situation continued to deteriorate. In the 
early start of 1999, at least 45 innocent people were killed—including women and 
children—in the village of Recak. Ambassador Walker went to the crime scene and was 
stunned to what he saw. Without getting a clearance from Richard Holbrooke or the State 
Department, he addressed the media calling the Recak massacre an “unspeakable atrocity 
and a crime against humanity.”99 The KVM team had not been able to prevent the 
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massacre but they were able to prevent it from occurring in secret. This gave a signal to 
the West that Milosevic hasn’t change, or at least has become worse. The massacre of 
Recak was a defining atrocity and “set wheels in motion.”100 It became the symbol of the 
breakdown of the October agreement and eventually led to the NATO military 
intervention.  
Milosevic was in complete denial over Recak. He claimed that it was the KLA who 
committed the atrocities. Outraged by Ambassador Walker comments, Milosevic 
declared him a persona non-grata. Nevertheless, Ambassador Walker remained in Kosovo. 
The international community demanded several times an international investigation to 
prove those allegations, but Milosevic refused. The OSCE wanted to send a forensic team 
to investigate, but they were denied visas. Judge Louise Arbour—head of the 
International Court Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)—was denied entry to 
Kosovo. The ICTY was established as a result of brutal fights and crime scenes in 
Yugoslavia. It was the first war crimes court established by the UN since Nuremberg and 
Tokyo tribunals. The ICTY had the authority to prosecute individuals responsible for 
crimes committed within the territory of Yugoslavia starting from 1991 onwards. 
As the situation was getting worse, the international community decided to 
become more involved. Since the UNSC could not agree on a military response, the 
chances for inducing change from outside remained minimal.101 The European leaders 
were confident that a political stalemate could be reached. French President Jacques 
Chirac told UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, “we must make one more attempt to negotiate 
a political solution. We Europeans must take responsibility for Europe.”102 In January 
1999, the Contact Group—composed of the US, UK, Germany, France, Italy and Russia—
demanded Belgrade and Pristina to pursue negotiations in Rambouillet, Paris.103 The 
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Rambouillet had a symbolic connotation. The US wanted to maintain a low profile and 
avoid the impression of “another Dayton;” thus, allowing the Europeans to take the 
public lead.104 The negotiations at Rambouillet were convened by French Foreign 
Minister Huber Vedrine and his British counterpart, Robin Cook. NATO proposed a 
peaceful solution in the Rambouillet Conference, ending the war, returning substantial 
autonomy to Kosovo and deployment of NATO troops to maintain order.105  
Albright believed this was the last chance for a peaceful solution. She was heavily 
involved in the negotiations from the back door and did not want to leave anything to 
chance. She writes in her memoirs, “I warned that Kosovo had implications for the entire 
region. We could not allow the Serbs to define it as a purely internal matter. Milosevic 
was claiming that the Kosovars were violent, the violence began with him. The Albanians 
had had autonomy under Tito, but Milosevic had taken it away. There would have been 
no KLA had the Kosovars not been deprived of their rights. We had to approve concrete 
measures that would expand our leverage over Belgrade. That was how Milosevic had 
been brought to the table at Dayton and that was only language he would respond to 
now.”106 Negotiations were excessively polarized. Albanians did not want Kosovo under 
Serbia, but they did not have much choice, they could either choose autonomy or nothing. 
The Serb officials did not want Kosovo to gain the autonomy back. Milosevic refused to 
attend the conference on the basis that Kosovo was part of Serbia, therefore he suggested 
that the responsible person to negotiate should be the Serbian President Milan 
Milutinovic, not him. Yugoslavia refused to accept the deal because they did not want to 
see the return of the pre-1990 status-quo, nor the presence of the international community 
in Kosovo. 
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On 18 March 1999, the Albanian, American and British delegation signed the 
Rambouillet Accords while the Serbian and Russian representatives refused. In the 
meantime, the security situation in Kosovo became more alarming. Serb heavy artillery 
and combat troops started moving in Kosovo. By the end of the month, around 40,000 
Yugoslav Army troops were deployed to Kosovo.107 Diplomacy failed to deliver. The 
collapse of the Rambouillet conference let to a lot of second-guessing. For some the 
conference was too personal for Albright, implying that she desired to have “her own 
Dayton,” in the end, she was not Holbrooke.108 A number of experts criticized Albright’s 
poor negotiation tactics. They argued the negotiations were not flexible, avoiding 
additional carrots for the Serbs and refusing to exercise any significant sticks against 
Kosovo Albanians.109  But Rambouillet was not Dayton. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
parties had exhausted themselves with years of fighting, in contrast, Rambouillet was 
conveyed when fighting had resumed and neither side was prepared to compromise. 
Serbs did not want to anything that involved international military or administration in 
Kosovo, Kosovo Albanians on the other hand, had suffered for decades already and did 
not wanted to be ruled by Serbia anymore. Thus, Rambouillet conference was not a 
failure. It takes two to tango, but Serbia refused. Milosevic did not even attend the 
conference, instead he sent a minor delegation with little or no power to delegate. 
Concerned about the safety of the KVM, the OSCE withdrew its staff from Kosovo. 
The Racak massacre made it clear that the OSCE mission was not working. The complete 
disregard of the Rambouillet Conference delivered a strong signal about Milosevic’s 
unwillingness to reach a peaceful compromise. The intervention was practically 
inevitable, the questions were how and when this should take place. According to 
General Wesley Clark memoirs, prior to the operation they reviewed all the military 
options. Klaus Naumann—the German general and the chairman of the Alliance’s 
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Military Committee—noted a significant different in Kosovo in 1998, there was nothing 
comparable to the Croats’ ground campaign of 1995 that could threaten the Serbs with 
defeat. Airpower by itself offered no guarantee of success.110 The Americans had learned 
this from Vietnam. Moreover, they also had to deal with another battle, that of the media 
and public opinion. While the air campaign was more likely to succeed, this was not the 
case with the public opinion. The battle for public opinion is dangerous. NATO countries 
are predominantly democratic with media openness, they were aware that any military 
mistake would have seriously endangered the outcome of the campaign. This was 
arguably the first conflict in which the weight of public opinion would be decisive.111  
Holbrooke tried one more time with a final ultimatum. He went to Belgrade and 
demanded Milosevic to withdraw his forces from Kosovo and come back to the 
negotiation table, otherwise he would be punished. On the eve of the 1999 NATO 
bombing campaign in Kosovo that would lead to his downfall, Slobodan Milosevic 
pleaded with Richard Holbrooke, “don’t you have anything more to say to me?” 
Holbrooke thought for a moment and deadpanned, “hasta la vista, baby.”112 By this time 
Holbrooke had known Milosevic for four years. Milosevic had already started three wars 
in Yugoslavia, against Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, he seemed ready 
to begin the fourth. Milosevic had already made up his mind. He believed that the 
international community was not interested in Kosovo and that his army would resist a 
couple of air strikes without a serious damage. He failed to understand that his evil 
actions were not only threatening Kosovo, but also to the credibility of the international 
institutions and Western nations.  
President Clinton survived impeachment and had to once again face Milosevic. 
This time Clinton administration was more confident on exercising American power with 
allies on its side, aiming only one outcome, success; because “failure,” as he stated, “was 
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not an option.”113 Failure would have called into doubt NATO’s raison d’etre and the 
organizations competence in the post-Cold War world. While the Europeans were still 
insisting for a diplomatic solution, the crisis in Kosovo was a strong signal that the US 
had still to play its part in Europe.114 There was a high probability that procrastinating 
the intervention was increasing the chances of having another Srebrenica. In Bosnia, the 
international community tried to prevent the Bosnian Serbs from consolidating their 
victory, but without going all the way to consistent military support for the Bosniaks and 
Croats. This time there were only two sides and President Clinton was aiming for a 
comprehensive outcome. 
The constant disregard of the international community, the unwillingness to 
discuss solutions, the continuation of war crimes and huge violations of human rights left 
the Western nations with no other alternative but to intervene. On 24 March 1999, NATO 
initiated a 78 days’ (eleven weeks) air campaign. Supreme Allied Commander General 
Wesley Clark stated the military mission was to “attack, disrupt, degrade, devastate and 
ultimately destroy the Yugoslav forces and facilities, unless Milosevic complies with the 
demands of the international community.”115 President Clinton addressed his people 
listing three objectives for the campaign: “to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's 
purpose so that the Serbian leaders understand the imperative of reversing course; to 
deter an even bloodier offensive against innocent civilians in Kosovo; and, if necessary, 
to seriously damage the Serbian military's capacity to harm the people of Kosovo.”116 The 
air campaign emphasized five objectives obliging Milosevic to accept: (1) a verifiable 
cessation of all combat activities and killings; (2) withdrawal of Serb military, police and 
paramilitary forces; (3) the deployment of an international military force; (4) the return 
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of all refugees and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid and (5) a political framework 
for Kosovo based on the Rambouillet Accords.117 
There were limits to the air campaign. The airpower could threaten and destroy, 
but without ground troops there was no assurance that Yugoslav forces would withdraw 
from Kosovo.118 The ground operation, on the other hand, was hardly achievable. Clinton 
administration had rejected any idea of deploying ground forces in Kosovo no matter 
what the circumstances. He feared such a decision was bound to be rejected by the 
Congress at home and by allies abroad.119 The Europeans additionally, were skeptical 
about the air campaign since the very beginning of it, therefore committing ground forces 
was almost unthinkable. Experts assumed that NATO’s use of significant force would 
quickly bring Milosevic to the negotiating table. Also, they assumed that NATO’s 
superior force would be over in a matter of days or a few weeks, at most.120 Sensing the 
political skepticism, General Clark pushed the Europeans for a ground operation in order 
to strengthen their determination to intensify the air campaign.121 The rejection of ground 
force deployment was a good strategy for two reasons. One, given the Balkans 
mountainous geography, a ground invasion would have been very difficult. And two, 
the decision to send ground forces would have probably had a negative impact, Milosevic 
could have used all its military capabilities on innocent civilians.    
Having support from the air, the KLA increased their attacks on the Yugoslav 
army and paramilitaries. The KLA was usually organized in small groups and launched 
attacks by surprise. Incapable of defending himself from the superior NATO army and 
being attacked by the KLA on the ground, malevolent Milosevic decided to release his 
wrath on the civilians. One of the most brutal massacres was committed in the village of 
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Meja (Western Kosovo). Yugoslav army committed mass executions in the village, killing 
372 men and boys in cold blood. The Meja Massacre was the largest one committed by 
the Yugoslav army in the Kosovo war. 
The air campaign was very efficient as targets were carefully planned; however, 
there were some incidents. By flying at medium altitude, NATO reduced the danger to 
its own pilots; however, it sometimes increased the risks for civilians on the ground.122 
Even at lower altitudes pilots cannot easily differentiate between civilians and soldiers, 
let alone medium altitude. Around 500 Albanian and Serb civilians were killed 
accidentally by NATO and two NATO troops died.123 The most notable errors happened 
were the bombardment of a bridge in southern Serbia while a passenger train was 
crossing, killing mostly Serb civilians and hitting a convoy of Kosovo Albanian refugees 
which NATO mistook for an armored column.124 Furthermore, the US Air Force bombed 
the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese journalists and injuring 20 people. 
According to the US government, the intention had been to bomb the nearby Yugoslav 
Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement and the Central Intelligence Agency 
have identified the wrong coordinates.125 President Clinton apologized publicly saying 
that the attack was a mistake. Despite such assurances, a wave of anti-America spread 
across China. Nevertheless, the air campaign continued. The incidents were modest 
considering the standards of war. 
At the end of May, President Clinton wrote an op-ed in New York Times where he 
explained to the American people and the world why the US and its allies are waging 
war in Kosovo. “We are in Kosovo with our allies to stand for a Europe, within our reach 
for the first time, that is peaceful, undivided and free. And we are there to stand against 
the greatest remaining threat to that vision: instability in the Balkans, fueled by a vicious 
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campaign of ethnic cleansing.”126 In Serbia, NATO bombings and Milosevic’s nationalist 
propaganda rallied most Serbs around the flag. NATO air campaign became the symbol 
of Serb resistance. Serb forces felt a new sense of purpose. Even the anti-Milosevic 
sentiment tended to condemn NATO attacks.127 Most Serb leaders were unwilling to 
criticize or even acknowledge the atrocities being committed against ethnic Albanians in 
Kosovo.128 However, frequent NATO bombing threw enormous pressure on Milosevic 
shoulders. It became very hard for Serbs to live under the threat of NATO. The bombings 
debilitated his relationship with the army. On 09 June 1999, Milosevic agreed to end the 
war by signing the Kumanovo agreement—which served as Yugoslavia’s terms of 
surrender—acknowledging the international community Force “KFOR” (Kosovo Force) 
authority and the withdrawal of all Serbian troops from Kosovo.129 Only when NATO 
received a verification of the withdrawal of all Serbian forces, Operation Allied Force 
suspended its air campaign. The UNSC adopted Resolution 1244 authorizing the 
presence of the NATO led international peacekeeping force known as the Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) and established the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). 
The next assignment was to deploy the KFOR in Kosovo.  
The Russians wanted to have their own sector—independent from NATO—in the 
North of Kosovo, where most of the Serbs live. But NATO was not willing to allow that, 
because there was a fear that a separate Russian sector would eventually lead to Kosovo’s 
partition. Russia did not welcome this decision; thus, they decided to move in ahead of 
KFOR deployment and occupied the Airport of Pristina. Frustrated with Russian actions, 
General Clark ordered the KFOR Commander Mike Jackson (British Officer) to block the 
runaways of Pristina Airport and isolate the Russian contingent stationed there. Mike 
Jackson refused to obey the order, he replied, “sir, I am not starting World War III for 
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you.”130 Jackson had established a liaison with the Russians and was convinced that this 
could be handled serenely. Besides, neither Washington nor London wanted a military 
confrontation and escalate the situation further. Therefore, instead of blocking the 
runaways, the British troops blocked the roads leading from the airfield in order to block 
Russian reinforcements. 
Had the Russian achieved their aims, they would run it as a separate mission. 
Kosovo would have been effectively partitioned, allowing the Serbs to retain the northern 
part and NATO would lose the principle of command and control.131  However, Russia 
did not get its own sector, the Serb forces withdrew completely, the international 
peacekeeping force force (KFOR) was deployed as planned, a possible dangerous 
confrontation with the Russians was avoided, KLA started demilitarizing and the 
refugees were pouring in. The mission objectives were accomplished. Moreover, the US 
established its biggest military base in Kosovo, “Camp Bondsteel,” the largest one in the 
Balkans. NATO won the war but not yet peace. The next task was to ensure a secure 




“Barbarity cannot be allowed to defeat justice… it is simply the right thing to do.” 
—Anthony Blair, 1999 
The problem in Europe was confusion. Public opinion and politicians perceived 
the beginning of tensions and the erosion of conflict as an internal conflict of Yugoslavia 
rather than nationalist aggression and hatred. Luxemburg’s foreign Minister Jacques 
Poos stated that the “hour of Europe has come” as the Balkans descended into chaos and 
the killing fields of Europe. Europe stood powerless to influence the events on the 
grounds. Srebrenica was Europe’s shame and a symbol of collective failure. Europe 
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realized it could not function without the US’s support, Srebrenica was a moment of 
reflection for the Europeans and not the European moment. The Europeans learned an 
important lesson here, a lesson that would be revisited in the Kosovo war. 
The EU established the Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1992, aiming to 
preserve and strengthen international security in accordance with the UN Charter to 
promote international co-operation and to develop and consolidate democracy and the 
rule of law and respect for human rights and freedoms. The fact is, there has never been 
a joint EU foreign policy. The EU consists of nation-states that do not necessarily share 
similar perspectives. EU states vary and have different priorities, interests and objectives. 
This was made evident during the fragmentation of Yugoslavia. While the European 
nations were overwhelmingly in favor of getting more involved and stopping the war in 
Kosovo, they had different approaches and methods to solve the problem. 
Although the reforms of the Lisbon Treaty have strengthened the capacities of the 
EU, its foreign policy remains weak. The EU emphasizes the role of institutions and the 
rule of law, highlighting the importance of soft-power and spending a lot of resources on 
diplomacy. Even today, the EU has been struggling to adapt to new trends of world 
politics. The decision-making process is the most difficult task. EU member states decide 
on a common foreign policy by unanimity and run their own national policy in parallel. 
Thus, such a structure creates limitations on collective actions due to the diversity of 
interests, fragmented leadership and free-riding.132 Despite the creation of an EU foreign 
policy chief, the EU is still a fractious build. The foreign policy chief is responsible to all 
EU members, each one them is represented by its foreign policy ministers as well as 
national inclinations. The EU suffers from overlapping institutions; for instance, not 
every EU member state recognizes Kosovo’s independence neither do they have similar 
approach regarding Kosovo. 
When war broke out in 1991 in Slovenia and Croatia, the European Community 
embarked on a policy of localized solutions such as the Brioni Accord which has neither 
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stopped the violence nor resolved the fundamental grounds of the violence. Europe failed 
to understand the wars in Yugoslavia as part of an integrated complex of differences in 
terms of ideologies, customs, culture and history. Europe failed to understand that a 
bloody civil war was imminent in Europe and that more energy and resources were 
needed in order to prevent it. 
During the conflict in Kosovo, NATO had military superiority, but the battle of the 
media was the most difficult one, because public opinion varied across the EU. They had 
to make sure that the intervention would not appear like an invasion but as joint cause to 
stop a dictator from killing innocent civilians. This situation is best described by James 
Fearon who coined the term “audience cost.” According to Fearon, a leader should never 
make a commitment to use force (set a red line) without the willingness to act.133 
Otherwise, the leader will have to confront domestic discord and pay the price by losing 
elections. In democracies such as the EU, the audience cost of losing power and support 
at home is very high. Moreover, the conflict in Kosovo had a problem of credibility, 
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Country Approve (%) Disapprove (%) 
Britain 67 29 
France 62 32 
Germany 54 44 
Italy 51 40 
Belgium 42 45 
Portugal 41 51 
Spain 39 49 
Greece 2 97 
Figure 3: European Public Opinion of NATO Intervention in Yugoslavia, by country, 
June 2, 1999. 
Source: Kosovo Task Force, “Kosovo Situation Reports” (Congressional Research 
Service, June 22, 1999), p. 6, based on polling by the French daily newspaper Liberation. 
a. The question was asked, do you approve or disapprove of NATO military 
intervention in Yugoslavia? 
 
The conflict in Kosovo came at a time when a new generation of social democratic 
leaders were governing Europe: Gerhard Schroeder in Germany, Tony Blair in Britain, 
Lionel Jospin in France, Massimo D’Alema in Italy and many more. Gerhard Schroeder 
was just appointed Chancellor of Germany. Schroeder led the coalition of Social 
Democrats and the Greens. The Foreign Minister came from the Greens, Joschka Fischer. 
The coalition focused on promoting social equality and disarmament, indeed a very 
peaceful ideological perspective. The war in Kosovo came as an early cold shower that 
threatened to bring an early end to his governance. German politics was entering the 
world’s stage, their position was important. Germany was hesitant, because this was the 
first time since World War II that they would fight against a country that had suffered so 
much under the Nazi occupation. The sense of guilt from the Nazi era was still a powerful 
psychological factor, so Germany did not want to take the first step. When war broke out 
in the Balkans, Germans were unsure on how Germany would react. Many argued that 
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Germany had a special duty to prevent genocide. The German soldiers were deployed 
for the first time since World War II in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina but were not 
militarily engaged, they served as peacekeepers. The strong American and British stance 
in favor of the intervention persuaded them to join the cause. In Kosovo however, they 
functioned under the umbrella of KFOR and fired the first bullets after some local Kosovo 
Serbs did not follow their orders.   
The French were pushing for a diplomatic approach rather than a military one. In 
France, the vast majority of the population supported the intervention; however, factions 
on the far right and far left opposed it. Historically, France and Serbia had good relations, 
therefore France did not want to break that connection. The French believed that the 
Kosovo war was the European moment and Europe had to solve the situation through 
diplomatic channels and stop relying on the Americans too much. France hosted the 
Rambouillet talks that failed and brought humiliation to the European officials. When the 
allies intervened, France provided the second largest force. French planes made up 
around ten percent of Operation Allied Force. After diplomacy failed, France wanted to 
create a European counterbalance to America and show to the world it can launch 
military strikes independently on its own backyard.  
Amongst all, the UK was the strongest proponent for the intervention. UK Prime 
Minister Tony Blair supported the intervention on moral grounds and judged the it as 
the right cause, calling for a unified response to act. Prime Minister Blair used 
communication techniques to speed up the air campaign through public support and was 
successful. According to several domestic polls, majority of British citizens supported the 
intervention in Kosovo. Blair was so popular in Kosovo that some families named their 
sons—born during the conflict in Kosovo—after his name.134 The narrative he built 
persuaded other countries as well and played an important part in all aspects. 
Both Italian and Greek governments faced intense domestic opposition to military 
strikes. Italy’s involvement was crucial because it hosted one of the largest US military 
                                                 




bases in Europe and considering its geographical position, it was the closest base to 
launch the air strikes. The Italian perspective was equivalent; its political parties were 
divided on this matter and public support was against the intervention. However, Italy 
supported Albania financially regarding the refugee crisis. There were around 440,000 
refugees in Albania, or 1/4 of the Kosovo population.135 Greece, fueled by anti-American 
media and public opinion, was the only member of the EU to strongly oppose the 
intervention. The Greeks share Christian Orthodox heritage with the Serbs and felt a great 
sense of solidarity. The polls in Greece showed more than 95 percent of the population 
against bombing.136 Greece and Cyprus were worried that Kosovo’s intervention would 
legitimize Turkey’s earlier military seizure of Northern Cyprus.137 However, considering 
their long-term interests and being a good ally within NATO, Greek leaders didn’t want 
to be excluded from the process and in the end they decided to join. Greece did not get 
involved during the intervention but after the war, Greek troops deployed as part of the 
KFOR mission.  
The new NATO members, Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary that joined the 
Alliance in March 1999, found themselves at war two weeks later. The Czech government 
was divided on the issue, President Vaclav Havel supporting the intervention whereas 
Prime Minister Milos Zeman distancing his government from it. Only 35 percent of Czech 
citizens supported the intervention.138 Polish people on the other hand, generally 
supported the intervention, with 60 percent of the public approving the air campaign.139 
Hungary—Serbia’s neighbor—was divided on this matter because Serbia’s northern 
region, Vojvodina, inhabits around 300,000 ethnic Hungarians. As such, Hungary wanted 
to avoid the bombardment of that area. However, Hungary cooperated fully with NATO 
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allowing them to use its airspace and transportation routes.140 Hungary also prevented a 
Russian aid convoy headed to Yugoslavia from proceeding.   
On the other side of the Atlantic, the US approach to the Yugoslav conflict began 
with a call for diplomacy backed with a warning that if negotiations fail it would turn 
quickly into a military coercion—diplomacy backed by force. Europeans failed to 
understand that unlike Western Europe, in the Balkans, fascist and nationalist layers does 
not simply appear on the surface; instead, a history of violence and hatred strengthens 
such behaviors. Once diplomacy failed, the US feared another Srebrenica and did not 
want to wait longer. While the Europeans wanted more time for diplomacy, the US 
pushed for the air campaign. President Clinton understood a bitter lesson in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, that if diplomacy is not coupled by the threat of force, or the willingness to 
use force in an unstable environment such as the Balkans, diplomacy is often ineffective. 
President Clinton was able to gather support from his European allies. 
Subsequently, support for the intervention came from Canada, Australia, Japan, New 
Zealand and Switzerland, making it a multilateral approach.  Multilateralism increased 
the chances of a successful intervention. According to Christopher Hill who served as the 
US Ambassador to Macedonia and Special Envoy to Kosovo, success was not guaranteed 
unless the Europeans agreed.141 However, keeping everyone on board was difficult as 
every decision had to go through NATO, meaning that all member states’ opinions had 
to be considered; still, the US was the key actor. Even after the air campaign started, 
differences were always present. In his memoirs, General Clark points out a fundamental 
change between America and Europe. “The US was increasingly committed to the idea 
of strategic strikes. The Europeans were more interested in limiting the strikes to Kosovo, 
trying to hit the ground forces and avoid actions that might antagonize or damage Serbia 
further.”142 
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Since the second part of the 20th century, American and European way of doing 
politics were substantially different. Americans and Europeans do not share a common 
view of the world. Europe has moved beyond power politics and has become more 
institutionalized, a society where laws, rules, negotiations and cooperation are the key 
focus. The US however, exercises power worldwide. For Americans, institutional 
organizations and law are good but not always reliable. Thus, the exercise of power is 
essential in order to defend and promote the liberal order. Robert Kagan’s article Power 
and Weakness states that Americans and Europeans have different mindsets, “Americans 
are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus, they agree on little and understand one 
another less and less. And this state of affairs is not transitory—the product of one 
American election or one catastrophic event…When it comes to setting national 
priorities, determining threats, defining challenges and fashioning and implementing 
foreign and defense policies, the US and Europe have parted ways.”143 Europeans 
approach problems with different angels and greater nuance. They are more patient 
when solving problems and show greater patience when solutions are not easy to finalize. 
For Europe, the rule of law and institutions are the alpha and beta to every issue. In 
general, the Europeans appreciate diplomacy and consensus. “They often emphasize 
process over result, believing that ultimately process can become substance.”144 However, 
there are some differences within Europe as well. The UK for instance, has a more 
“American” view of power than the rest, its foreign policy is something between the US 
and Europe.  
In the US, Democrats appear to be more “European” rather than Republicans. 
American Democrats are not Europeans and when it comes to power politics, they might 
seem more hesitant to use it, but when they are convinced they will act. The 
bombardment of a capital city (Belgrade) in Europe would have never been possible 
without the US’s forced hand. Despite the fact that many believe that Europe and 
America as the Western front share the same or similar values and strategies, Europe and 
                                                 
143 Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Hoover Institution, June 2002, pp. 3-4. 
144 Ibid., 5. 
59 
 
America are different. Europe is a dove while America is hawkish. Europe has evolved 
towards the peaceful culture as a result of centuries of wars and clashes. Post-World War 
II, was a new beginning in European history, Europe evolved this way because of 
America. The US provided goods and security, creating a safe environment for 
cooperation between nations. Having such protection, Europe has been week in terms of 
its military for a long time. 
Europe has been the geopolitical pivot. During the fragmentation of Yugoslavia, 
both Americans and Europeans focused on the strategic importance of the old continent 
and the continuing significance of NATO. The expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe 
and the consolidation of Cold War victory kept Europe in the vanguard of the strategic 
debate. The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 opened the door for more cooperation and 
sustainable development. Many believed that Europe would be the next superpower, 
consisting of great economy, strong military and political influence. Samuel P. 
Huntington foretold that “the coalescing of the EU would be the single most important 
move in a worldwide reaction against American hegemony and would produce a truly 
multipolar twenty-first century.”145 However, the 1990s events in the Balkans witnessed 
not the rise of a European superpower but its relative decline. The conflict of Yugoslavia 
revealed European political disarray and military incapacity. The Kosovo conflict 
exposed a transatlantic gap in military technology and the ability to wage modern 
warfare. The Europeans simply were incapable of projecting decisive force in a region of 
conflict such as Balkans, the maximum they could do is provide peacekeeping forces, 
mitigate peaceful negotiations and impose economic sanctions. Indeed, the Europeans 
provided most the peacekeeping staff, but only after the US—largely on its own—carried 
most of the decisive strikes of the air campaign. As Robert Kagan writes, “the real division 
of labor consisted of the US making the dinner and the Europeans doing the dishes.”146 
Technology is crucial, the US can project its power in the world thanks to its sophisticated 
military technology. While many American politicians have argued of pulling back from 
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the world, the reality on the ground is that America intervened more abroad in the late 
20th century rather than the whole Cold War period. The US was able to use its high-tech 
capabilities through air and missile strikes without the involvement of ground troops. 
It is undeniably important to note that the role of the Western leaders was a crucial 
factor. The intervention would have never been possible without the strong stance of 
political leaders against ethnic-cleansing. Some of these leaders had gone through World 
War II, they understood the real consequences of war. Seeing similar images was 
intolerable for them. Unfortunately, many international relations theorists—except those 
who take a psychologist approach—neglect the role of the leaders on the international 
sphere. The case of Kosovo proves that leaders play an important role in foreign policy 
and their decisions are not always in line with the political agenda. The strong stance of 
the US and the UK convinced the rest of the European nations to join the collective 
security cause. 
The Kosovo conflict served as a “vivid reminder of lingering Hobbesian instincts 
that a neo-Kantian institutional reality in Europe has not fully tamed.”147 The failure in 
Rwanda and the late intervention in Bosnia, proved to be critical for prevailing in Kosovo.  
President Clinton admitted the US hadn’t done enough to halt the violence and promised 
that America would never again turn a blind eye toward genocide. The conflict in Kosovo 
introduced new rationales for intervention, based on “alleviating human distress” and 
“protecting vulnerable minorities.”148 It qualified the principle of non-interference, 
elevated the principle of self-determination and reduced the standing of UNSC. The 
intervention in Yugoslavia was just the first step of Clinton’s foreign policy in the 
Balkans. He was convinced that only a regime change could maintain long-term stability. 
Only when Milosevic fell from power in October 2000, Clinton felt the mission was 
accomplished. The intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are the landmark 
decisions of his presidency. It defined the legacy of the “Clinton doctrine” promising to 
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prevent future genocides and promote democratic enlargement.149 Bill Clinton visited 
Kosovo in November 2009. Kosovar authorities unveiled a statue of him on a boulevard 




“Kosovo is not a precedent, it is a sui generis case.” 
—Doris Pack, 2008150 
Intervention advocates argued that states cannot emphasize security and integrity 
without respecting human rights and ensuring a peaceful society in accordance with the 
UN charter. The action in Kosovo was justified by its supporters on two different 
grounds: the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and the enforcement of UNSC 
Resolutions 1160, 1199 and 1203.151 The first resolution called for an immediate cessation 
of violence and the negotiation of a solution through dialogue. The second was proposed 
to end the atrocities, allow the presence of the international community, guarantee 
freedom of movement, facilitate the return of the refugees and find a political solution. 
The third resolution, recalling the former resolutions—1160 and 1199—emphasized that 
the situation in Kosovo was a serious threat to peace and security; thus, it demanded that 
the Yugoslav authorities comply fully with resolutions 1160 and 1199.  
The interests of the international community have often been the subject of intense 
discussion. This time, a small country located in the southeastern part of Europe with less 
than two million people was the center of attention in world politics. The arena of political 
confrontation was the UN charter, specifically article 2(4) which defines that “states shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state.” Exceptions exist when a state acts in self-
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defense or when the UNSC finds a "threat to the peace, a breach of peace or act of 
aggression."152 The UN charter explicitly mentions “states” and according to international 
law, a state is an organized political community which has a permanent population, 
defined territory, government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.153 
Kosovo was not a state, so according to the definition, no state had been attacked. As a 
result, the self-defense exception would have to be stretched in order to apply to Kosovo, 
because the UNSC resolutions on Kosovo were disregarded by Serb authorities, who 
claimed that the conflict was an internal matter of Serbia. 
The proponents of intervention constructed a stronger case. They argued that the 
primary objective was to prevent genocide. They pointed to Srebrenica stating that 
Milosevic could not be trusted. General Clark recalls Milosevic remarks about Albanians, 
during a meeting with him and the German General Klaus Naumann. “We know how to 
deal with the problem of these Albanians.’ Where they asked. ‘We’ve done this before in 
the Drenica region in central Kosovo in 1946.’ They asked what the solution was. His 
response was ‘we killed them. We killed them all. It took several years, but eventually we 
killed them all. And we had no problem.”154 This a vivid example that portrays the true 
identity of Milosevic, he said such comments about an entire ethnic group during an 
official meeting with NATO representatives. The West clearly understood that diplomacy 
was not the way to go. Another argument was that the intervention would be 
multilateral. Unlike the Bosnian intervention, which was in accordance with the UN 
Charter, the intervention in Kosovo was questionable in terms of its legality. But the West 
was not seeking to annex Kosovo, they wanted to stop the violence, bring freedom and 
ensure stability. The West could not accept and put its credibility at risk. They were 
constantly threatening Belgrade to stop the slaughter or he would face strong military 
opposition—a decision they would not circumvent. Most importantly, Milosevic’s 
barbaric ideas of ethnic-cleansing and systemic violence did not belong in Europe 
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anymore. The West send him a strong message that anyone who lives in Europe has to 
live by respect and dignity for the others. Europe has witnessed terrible wars in the past, 
killing people, annexing territories and suppressing minorities is not part of the narrative 
anymore. 
Kosovo was the subject of fundamental disagreements between the members of 
the UNSC, in particular its permanent members, about whether the use of force was 
indeed a last resort. Some states wanted to continue to pursue negotiations with 
Yugoslavia and accused NATO states of deliberately offering unacceptable terms at the 
Rambouillet talks.155 Most of the states supported the intervention, whereas Russia and 
China strongly opposed it. Such debate was in fact the very purpose of the UN. The 
opposition argued that sending foreign troops into a sovereign country without the 
authorization of the UNSC and not respecting the territorial integrity of states is a huge 
violation of international law. Russia and China had consistently made it clear that they 
would veto any proposal for military action against Yugoslavia, judging the intervention 
as an act of aggression. They accused the West of taking unilateral actions. Moreover, 
they stressed continuously the importance of the non-intervention norm as the 
fundamental basis of the UN and international security.156  
Russia was going through a tough post-Soviet transition and economic reforms 
and when it came to the intervention in Kosovo, Russia stood powerless before the 
Western allies. However, NATO’s attack on Serbia was an attack to a close ally for Russia, 
consequently the intervention has stimulated further opposition. Moscow’s Kafkaesque 
view on NATO intervention created a sentiment of nemesis. Kosovo became the 
battlefield of Russo-American relations. The intervention led to a serious deterioration 
between US-Russia relations. This negative impact shaped the Russian public opinion as 
well, reducing the numbers positively disposed toward the US from “57 percent to 14 
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percent.”157 Today, the Russian President, Vladimir Putin uses Kosovo as a reference of 
international law violation. He portrays himself as the watchdog of international law in 
international relations but engages in military conflicts and annexes territories such as in 
Georgia and Ukraine. He harnesses the perception of American exceptionalism to play 
the victim card to keep his people and allies away from the West. Russian foreign policy 
in the Balkans can be perceived as a traditional international affairs deterrence approach. 
Kosovo continues to play a significant role in Russian foreign policy. Kosovo is not a 
member of the UN, but it is represented by the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General. Russian continuous opposition over Kosovo remains the same. Russia uses 
Kosovo as a precedent to demonstrate its veto power at the UNSC.  
In the 1990s, the Westphalian system was no longer an adequate framework for 
international affairs. Sovereignty and legitimacy could no longer be the de facto power 
authority; dictators and human rights abusers such as Milosevic could not hide behind 
the principle of “sovereignty” to protect themselves. Criminals and oppressors such as 
Milosevic were responsible for huge violations of human rights, ethnic cleansing and 
genocide; therefore, under these circumstances the international community in the name 
of human rights and democratic legitimacy had the right and the obligation to intervene. 
NATO launched the air campaign to stop the oppression, not attack Serbia. As General 
Clark emphasizes “it was not a campaign against the Serbian people. It focused 
specifically on the forces of repression from top to bottom to coerce a change in their 
behavior.”158 It did not do so to uphold the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense or with explicit authorization from the UNSC. Neither did it justify its action 
under the 1948 Genocide Convention. However, these facts do not mean that the 
alliance's action was illegitimate. The UNSC had identified the crisis in Kosovo as a threat 
to international peace and security in 1998. NATO did not request the council's 
authorization to use force in 1999, because Russia indicated that it would veto any such 
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resolution. Yet, Moscow and Beijing also failed to offer any promising alternative 
strategies for stopping the bloodshed. That left the NATO countries with a choice 
between not acting in response to the humanitarian emergency or acting without the 
UNSC's explicit backing. After much debate, the allies chose the latter option, justifying 
their decision by the urgency of the situation.159 
The Yugoslav government as a sovereign state had the right to govern the country 
as they pleased, however this didn’t mean that Milosevic had a carte blanche on the people 
he represented. As the then-director of the policy Planning Staff at the State Department, 
Richard Haas put it, “Sovereignty entails obligations. One is not to massacre your own 
people.”160 The question for humanitarian intervention has often been portrayed as a 
debate over the priority that should be accorded to either sovereignty or human rights. 
After the Cold War, the horrors in Rwanda, Bosnia, Somalia and Iraq made states rethink 
the use of UN Charter, chapter VII to authorize humanitarian intervention. However, 
there was a strong commitment against interference in sovereign states therefore UNSC 
was unable to authorize intervention in states that abused and killed their citizens. Article 
2(7) of the UN Charter prohibits states from interfering in the domestic affairs of other 
states, while Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force except in self-defense or with 
the approval of the UNSC. 
NATO initiated an air campaign against the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia to topple its leader Slobodan Milosevic and prevent the ethnic cleansing of 
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. NATO was forced to act without the authorization of the 
UNSC, because Russia and China believed the situation was an internal affair matter of 
Yugoslavia and wasn’t serious enough to intervene; thus, they threatened they would 
veto any mandate to warrant military intervention. The case of Kosovo raised two 
important questions: is it legitimate for a group of states to intervene without UN 
approval and how can states make that judgment whether there has been enough killings 
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to give the green light for intervention? Questions such as these made scholars worldwide 
rethink and restudy the definition of sovereignty. In 1996, Francis Deng published a book 
titled Sovereignty as Responsibility which states that “sovereignty carriers with it certain 
responsibilities for which governments must be held accountable. And they are 
accountable not only for their own national constituencies but ultimately to the 
international community.” (Deng et al. 1996). In other words, by effectively discharging 
its responsibilities for good governance, a state can legitimately claim protection for its 
national sovereignty. According to Deng, sovereignty requires a demonstration of 
national and international responsibility. 
The intervention in Kosovo inspired future events. In order to prevent future 
Kosovo’s, the UN adopted the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) declaration in 2005 World 
Summit. The declaration states that, “when states are unwilling or unable to protect their 
citizens from grave harm, the principle of non-interference ‘yields to the responsibility to 
protect (R2P).” This came as an attempt to make it difficult for UNSC members to veto 
when facing humanitarian emergencies, most importantly it makes it harder for states to 
violate human rights. The R2P declaration comprises of four main elements: (1) states 
recognized their responsibility to protect their own citizens from genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing; (2) they pledged to help states fulfill their 
primary responsibility; (3) the international community will take a host of non-coercive 
measures to prevent genocide and mass atrocities; (4) in extreme situations, where a 
government is manifestly failing to protect its citizens, the UNSC stands ready to 
intervene using the full range of its powers.161 
The R2P is based on principles of international law relating sovereignty, peace, 
security, conflict, and human rights. This mechanism rests solely on the UN and it is 
considered a measure of last resort. The R2P is an attempt to reconfigure the relationship 
between sovereignty, human rights, and international society. An Extension of the role 
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of the international community to protect societies vulnerable to abusive governments.162 
It suggests that this is not just a matter of charity but a matter of responsibility that states 
and international community must abide, because the very essence of international 
society are individual human rights. R2P delivers a strong notion that human beings 
matter more than sovereignty radiated.163 While humanitarian intervention has no legal 
basis in the international law, the R2P has both a legal and moral basis, offering sanctions, 
capacity-building and mediation when a conflict takes place.  
Although, Obama administration used this mechanism as a justification for the air 
campaign in Libya, the same standards are not taken into consideration when it comes to 
the Syrian conflict. The R2P has been subject of debate regarding its implementation. The 
intervention in Libya and the destabilization of the region has seriously damaged this 
mechanism and has made it harder to enforce it today. The R2P remains an international 
norm facing its challenges. However, the R2P is a major step in international community. 
It is an international commitment which was endorsed by all member states of the UN 
for the purpose of preventing war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing and grimes against 
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“At some point in time, sooner rather than later, you have got to say enough is enough. Kosovo 
is independent.” 
—George W. Bush, 2007164 
After the war everything changed. Yugoslav flags were removed, replaced by the 
Albanian and Western flags. Street names were changed from Serbian to Albanian. The 
symbols that characterized the former regime simply disappeared. Joy and happiness 
replaced fear and terror. Now, people could see the real consequences of war, missing 
people, devastated infrastructure, destroyed homes and buildings. The ethnic Albanians 
felt happiness, but also felt the need for revenge. Sometimes the feel of vengeance trumps 
happiness and love. Fearing about a possible attack on Serbian communities in Kosovo, 
Senator Joseph Biden publicly asked Kosovo Albanians to be peaceful, he said “we are 
with you, but do not do to the Serbs what they did to you.”165 Some people disregarded 
Biden’s warning and began to attack Serb communities causing a significant number of 
them to evacuate. The rest—under KFOR protection—started living in isolated enclaves 
within Kosovo. But, ethnic Albanians who have been discriminated and persecuted for 
decades, driven from their homes and lands and brutalized during the conflict, can be 
forgiven a certain paranoia, even if their revenge attacks against local Serbs cannot be 
condoned.166  
After recalling the previous resolutions, the UNSC adopted resolution 1244 (10 
June 1999) authorizing civil and military presence in Kosovo and established the United 
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Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).167 The Resolution was 
adopted by 14 votes to none against, China abstained. Except being against the air 
campaign since the very beginning, China’s main reason for abstention was the 
bombardment of its embassy in Belgrade during the conflict. Resolution 1244 demanded 
an immediate end of violence and repression; demanded the withdrawal of Yugoslav 
military, police and paramilitary forces; encouraged all member states and international 
organizations to contribute economic reconstruction; encouraged the safe return of 
refugees and internally displaced persons; demanded full cooperation with the ICTY; 
demanded the demilitarization of the KLA and other armed groups; decided for an 
international civil and military presence under the UN.168 The problem with the 
resolution is that it recognizes Kosovo as part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, an 
entity which was dissolved in 1992. Thus, the Resolution remains legally binding to all 
parties. However, the Resolution authorized the UN to determine Kosovo’s future taking 
into consideration the Rambouillet Accords. 
The Resolution mandated UNMIK with “organizing and overseeing the 
development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-
government.”169 UNMIK comprised of four pillars: 1) police and justice led by the UN; 2) 
civil administration led by the UN; 3) democratization and institution building led by the 
OSCE; and 4) reconstruction and economic development led by the EU. Additionally, 
KFOR was responsible for peacekeeping and maintaining security. UNMIK was a true 
amalgamation of international organizations, something that had never happened before. 
Ensuring peace and stability was a difficult task to achieve. The failure of NATO 
deployment in time, allowed Serbs in North Mitrovica (Northern Kosovo) to establish 
informal security forces, otherwise known as the “parallel structures” that prevented 
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Albanians from moving freely and questioned the legitimacy of UNMIK.170 As such, the 
city of Mitrovica was divided into two parts, North and South. After the war, most of the 
Serbs moved into the Northern part of the city, occupying most of the homes belonging 
to Albanians. Despite the presence of KFOR, some ethnic Albanians—traumatized by the 
war and the loss of their beloved ones—did not want to see Serbs in Kosovo. Looking for 
vengeance, sporadic violence continued but eventually declined through the years. Such 
unpleasant circumstances are still present nowadays, although on a much smaller scale. 
The international community, mainly Western nations invested heavily to 
reconstruct the war-torn country. International assistance for Kosovo’s reconstruction 
proved more generous than for any earlier post conflict response.171 The US and 
international organizations spent $1.5 billion on financial assistance to Kosovo in 1999 
and 2000, including funding for budgetary assistance, reconstruction and recovery and 
peace implementation.172 Moreover, “the U.S. and its allies have put 25 times more money 
and 50 times more troops, on a per capita basis, into post-conflict Kosovo than into post-
conflict Afghanistan. This higher level of input accounts in significant measure for the 
higher level of output measured in the development of democratic institutions and 
economic growth.”173 
Kosovo was governed through a system of overlapping authorities: UN 
administrative protectorate and a provisional government. The reason being Kosovo—
until 1999—was a province of Yugoslavia and was technically under the sovereignty of 
Belgrade. Unlike Bosnia, Kosovo had no institutions; thus, KFOR and UNMIK 
cooperated with each other. UNMIK helped through well-qualified staff members who 
professionally assisted the local civil servants. Within years, UNMIK was capable of 
creating working institutions—in three years Kosovo had a fiscal policy, tax system, 
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government and democratic elections were held. In the same period, KFOR was 
constantly providing professional and military assistance to the ad hoc Kosovo Protection 
Corps (KPC), which today is known as the Kosovo Security Force (KSF, not an army but 
a defense force). Providing humanitarian assistance, security and civil administration 
were key to establishing a peaceful environment in Kosovo. The success of UNMIK and 
KFOR is being questioned by civil society and NGOs in Kosovo and abroad, however, 
considering the situation and the circumstances there was a relative progress that should 
be praised. 
Kosovo held its first (local) elections under UNMIK in 27 October 2000. The 
Kosovar political spectrum consisted of three predominant parties: The Democratic 
League of Kosovo (LDK); the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK); and the Alliance for the 
Future of Kosovo (AAK). This time, Serbs boycotted the elections. Next year, on 18 
November, national elections brought an elected “provisional government,” consisting 
of a president, prime minister and cabinet. On the other hand, the Serbs lost patience with 
Milosevic’s harms and devastation he brought to them. Milosevic lost the presidential 
elections in Serbia. Failing to admit defeat, he provoked violent public protest which 
eventually ended his power. The next year, Milosevic was arrested by the government of 
Serbia on corruption charges, then extradited to the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Hague, Netherlands, to stand trial on approximately 60 
charges of crimes of war, crimes against humanity and genocide, in the conflicts of 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.174  
When George W. Bush won the elections in 2001, many Albanians were 
disappointed. Knowing that Republicans and Democrats have different objectives, 
Kosovo Albanians believed that President Bush had a different foreign policy approach 
and Kosovo was not part of his agenda. Bush indeed had a different foreign policy, after 
9/11 his focus was entirely on national emergency issues such as the interventions in 
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Afghanistan and Iraq and the fight against global terrorism. However, Kosovo was part 
of his vision. President Bush attempted to distance itself from the Clinton’s foreign policy. 
He initiated a withdrawal of US military forces from the Balkans. This came out to be an 
immature decision. A conflict broke in Macedonia. Ethnic Albanians—which comprises 
approximately 1/4 of the population—used this opportunity to assert their demands for 
a “Greater Albania,” having Kosovo and Western Macedonia join Albania. As 
everywhere in former Yugoslavia, ethnic Albanians were not treated equally; they 
believed this was their moment to breakout from the old regime and establish the true 
great Albania. The violence spread to the Presevo valley (South-East Serbia) mainly 
populated by ethnic Albanians. It seemed that a new conflict was underway, but this time 
the West was quick to react and negotiate a ceasefire. On 13 August 2001, the government 
of Macedonia and ethnic Albanian representatives signed the peace agreement, otherwise 
known as the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The agreement ended the conflict and 
granting more rights to ethnic Albanians such as affirmative acts, participation in 
governance and judiciary, making Albanian an official language, amnesty for guerrilla 
fighters, et cetera.175 
After the war, Kosovo Albanians welcomed UNMIK. They saw the mission as the 
departure of the old regime and as the vehicle towards independence. A couple of years 
later, this perception changed and started to fade away. UNMIK was now seen as the 
main obstacle towards independence. The procrastination of the final political status, the 
absence of the US and the refusal of UNMIK to debate on the future of Kosovo, created 
uncomfortable conditions. Furthermore, unemployment was high and the economy was 
performing poorly. Foreign direct investment—except the Albanian diaspora—was 
almost inexistent. The inability to travel internationally also frustrated people. They grew 
increasingly fed up with the status-quo.  
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In Serbia, Zoran Djindic was elected Prime Minister, a highly educated person 
with a Physics Degree, fluent in German and a progressive politician. He attempted to 
overcome Serbia’s past demons, through institutional reforms and integration but was 
shot dead in 2004. A nationalist, Vojislav Kostunica, took his place. Kostunica has held 
rallies against Milosevic in the past, but when it came to Kosovo, no Serbian leaders—
whether democratic, progressive, or conservative—dared not to make any compromises. 
Whenever he had the chance to speak in public, Kostunica never missed the opportunity 
to talk about Kosovo as part of Serbia, regardless of the question he was asked.176 Such 
rhetoric, only worsened the situation, especially in Kosovo where people were not fully 
recovered from the devastating consequences of war and families were still waiting to 
find the bodies of their loved ones from mass graves. 
On 17 March, Kosovo witnessed an ethnic clash between the Albanians and Serbs. 
Three Albanian children who were playing in the Northern part of the city were 
confronted by a group of Serbian boys who set their dog on them. On a desperate attempt, 
they tried to escape the river and were drowned in the Iber River—which demarcates the 
North city of Mitrovica. Thousands of Albanians approached the Iber bridge whereas the 
Serbs gathered to prevent the Albanians from crossing the bridge. The only barrier 
standing between them was a limited number of KFOR troops. The situation escalated 
quickly, making the incident the biggest inter-ethnic violence since the end of the war. 
The drowning of kids led to local disturbances, riots and inter-ethnic violence. The small 
progress made by the UN, five years after the war faced a critical challenge. According to 
some estimates, around 50,000 Albanians participated in the riots. Eight of them were 
killed and around 300 were wounded. According to UN, in total, 31 people died and 950 
were injured. Mitrovica was not the only incident. The city of Prizren—Kosovo’s second 
largest city—witnessed the largest destruction. The protesters burned Serbian houses and 
                                                 




Orthodox religious sites. Moreover, every single UN office in Kosovo was attacked and 
more than 150 UN cars were burned.177 
Despite gradual improvement, the 2004 riots undermined the progress made thus 
far. It became crystal clear that Kosovo Albanians—comprising more than 90 percent of 
Kosovo population—would never tolerate the return of the Serbian governance. After the 
March riots, the clashes were mostly on the political level. Kosovo Albanians demanded 
full independence while Serbia and Kosovo Serbs called for the creation of an 
autonomous region of Kosovo within Serbia and Montenegro. The riots in Mitrovica 
forced the international community to act. The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
recommended the start of international negotiations on whether Kosovo should remain 
part of Serbia or gain independence. In 2006, the first major steps towards independence 
began. The decentralization talks began in the beginning of the year and continued 
throughout the year. UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari—former President of Finland 
and a Nobelist—developed a comprehensive package of measures to protect and 
promote minority rights of non-Albanian communities in Kosovo. Even though his plan 
was rejected by Serbia, it represents an enduring contribution for peace and coexistence.  
The consensus among international diplomats has been that a possible solution 
must avoid partition or unification with another state. Moreover, a number of them have 
clearly stated they would support “conditional independence” without granting the full 
state status. Serbia, strongly opposed any possibility of having an independent Kosovo 
state. They argued that any unilateral change of internationally recognized borders 
would contravene international law and posed serious threat to stability in the region. 
Moreover, they argued that Kosovo was incapable of running its own affairs, therefore 
such action would be extremely dangerous and immature leading to chaos. The 
international community knew that Serbia had already lost the right to govern Kosovo, 
the homogenous Albanian population would never accept the return of the old regime. 
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Before Ahitsaari’s departure to Kosovo, the international community was already 
aware of what would be the outcome of his final report. “France was historically pro-
Serb, but it changed course after elections and the appointment of Foreign Minister 
Philippe Douste-Blazy, who had served as the medical doctor during the war in Bosnia. 
He had affection and solidarity with the victims in Yugoslavia. Russia publicly supported 
the Yugoslav authority over Kosovo but did not completely reject the idea of 
independence. China saw Kosovo’s status issue as a European problem therefore it did 
not want to get involved. This was the case with most non-European nations. Besides, 
there were more important matters to discuss and worry about in the world and Kosovo 
was not on the lists. They were inclined to support any position adopted by the EU. The 
negotiations led by Ahtisaari initiated with three pre-existing conditions: no return to the 
status-quo, no partition and no redrawing of borders.178 The same year, in May, 
Montenegro organized an independence referendum where majority of citizens voted to 
separate from Yugoslavia. The course of events favored independence, with Montenegro 
gone, Kosovo became the last phase of Yugoslav agony. 
Incapable of doing much, Serbia used the destabilization card in Kosovo. Using 
the parallel forces, they tried to maintain tensions active, especially in the North of 
Kosovo. Serbia’s strategy was to divide Kosovo and delay the process. Belgrade tried to 
divide the Europeans by arguing that Kosovo’s independence would open the Pandora’s 
box and inspire other separatist groups. Serbia aimed to transcend fear in Europe and its 
periphery to rethink about potential independence movements to be inspired by Basques 
and Catalans in Spain, ethnic Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia, Turkish Cypriots in 
Cyprus, Abkhazians and Ossetians in Caucasus and beyond. They also tried to discredit 
Ahtisaari, accusing him of dishonoring Serbia and being bias in favor of the Albanians. 
Other than spreading tensions, Belgrade offered little beyond proposing that Kosovo 
remain an integral part of the Serbian state. But, the team for Kosovo’s status was already 
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made, negotiations were underway. Western countries strongly supported the idea and 
the US demanded a resolution.  
In February 2007, Ahtisaari unveiled his report before the UNSC, otherwise 
known as the “Ahtisaari Plan.” The plan envisioned the independence of Kosovo after a 
period of international supervision, or, in other words, a “supervised independence,” not 
a full one. The Ahtisaari plan briefly recommended the decentralization of Kosovo, 
special focus on strengthening the rule of law, strong laws to protect and integrate the 
minorities, maintaining democratic standards, et cetera. Ahtisaari proposed the 
deployment of European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) to supervise Kosovo’s 
institutions and contribute to the rule of law. Finally, Ahtisaari submitted his 
“Comprehensive Plan and Recommendations” to the UNSC on April 2007. After weeks 
of reviewing the plan, the Western nations proposed the replacement of the UN 
Resolution 1244, following the dissolution of UNMIK in a period of four months. 
Ahtisaari Plan faced major opposition in Belgrade. The Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav 
Kostunica denounced the proposal as “illegitimate and unacceptable.” Kosovo Albanians 
were not pleased by the plan, in fact they were discouraged. They believed that living 
seven years under UNMIK was enough supervision; thus, they saw the presence of the 
international supervision as prolonging the independence further. However, the 
important question was, when will Kosovo declare its independence? The UNSC met on 
09 July 2007. Part of the agenda was the endorsement of the resolution proposed by 
Ahtisaari. Russia and Indonesia spoke against the endorsement of Ahtisaari Plan. The 
UNSC proposed other edited draft resolutions, but again, the drafts were strongly 
rejected by Russia. It became evident that the independence of Kosovo would happen 
without the official approval of the UN.  
The US changed its approach aiming to get as many influential states to support 
Kosovo’s independence. On 10 July 2007, George W. Bush made a landmark visit in 
Albania, being the first American president to visit the former communist state. President 
Bush used this visit to show support for the UN’s plan for Kosovo’s independence. 
During his press conference he stated, “at some point in time, sooner rather than later, 
77 
 
you have got to say enough is enough. Kosovo is independent and that is the position we 
have taken.”179 President Bush started its first mandate with the unilateral invasion of 
Iraq, on the second term he shifted towards international cooperation. The independence 
of Kosovo benefited from President Bush shift to multilateralism. Although the 
declaration was coordinated with Europe, the Europeans were not as comfortable having 
Kosovo declare its independence without the approval of the UNSC. Considering 
President’s Bush hawkish leadership and the invasion of Iraq without the UNSC 
approval, made the Europeans draw comparisons of “unilateral actions,” and grew 
seriously skeptical regarding the legitimacy of the unilateral declaration of 
independence. 
Despite all challenges, the historic moment came. On 17 February 2008, the 
Parliament of Kosovo unanimously declared Kosovo to be independent of Serbia. The 
declaration symbolized a new chapter for the people of Kosovo, it signified the end of 
decades of violent oppression and discrimination. Subsequently, the first states to 
recognize the independence of Kosovo were Albania, US, UK, Costa Rica, followed by 
European states and democracies around the world. While an atmosphere of joy and 
happiness was reigning over Kosovo, in Serbia the situation deteriorated. Unable to 
accept reality, dozens of Serb hooligans gathered in front of the US embassy in Belgrade, 
smashed the windows and burned the American flag. German and Turkish embassies 
were also attacked. In Kosovo, Serbs attacked the UN building in North Mitrovica. Ethnic 
Albanians in Kosovo, Albania and around the world started celebrating for days. The 
moment of euphoria—after the declaration of independence—generated an illusion of 
harmony, achievement and the end of problems. The independence was a crucial 
milestone towards Kosovo’s statehood; however, the newborn state would have to keep 
moving forward and prove themselves in front of the international community. The 
constitution of Kosovo came to force a year later, in accordance with the Ahtisaari Plan. 
The constitution states that Kosovo is a parliamentary republic based on the separation 
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of power of the three branches of government: legislative, judiciary and executive. The 
constitution emphasizes that Kosovo is a multi-ethnic state, committed to the rule of law 
and the respect of minority rights.180 The parliament of Kosovo has 120 seats, 20 of which 
are minority reserved seats with veto power. The legislative has also adopted a gender 
quota of 30 percent for women to make sure women are represented fairly. 
 
THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION AND INTEGRATION 
 
“The field of public administration is necessarily more of an art than a science.” 
—Francis Fukuyama, 2004181 
The desire or struggle for recognition was first described by Plato in The Republic. 
Plato argued that there were three parts that comprise the soul: desire, reasoning and 
spiritedness. Desire demonstrates people seeking things outside their own; reason shows 
the best way to get those desires and spiritedness is the feeling people believe they have 
a certain worth and when other people do not respect that, they feel shame and anger. In 
contrast, when people respect and acknowledge their worth, they feel pride. A German 
philosopher revisited this concept in the 19th century. According to Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel, human beings are like animals, they have natural needs and desires for 
things outside of themselves. People, however, are different from animals, because they 
desire the desires of other people, that is, he or she wants to be recognized as a human 
being. What truly satisfies people is not so much material prosperity as it is the 
recognition of their status and dignity.  
Although people and states are not synonymous, the desire or struggle for 
recognition rhymes for both sides. The desire and struggle for recognition provides 
insights on the structure or the arrangement of relations of domestic politics 
characterizing the newest country in Europe. Kosovo is struggling to be a member in 
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many international organizations and the number of state recognitions has stagnated. 
Simply put, Kosovo is struggling to join the family of nations within the international 
community. The struggle for recognition and integration is essential, but Kosovo is facing 
an array of problems domestically as well. Kosovo’s constitution—the supreme law of 
the country—was written with the help of its international supporters. Technically 
speaking, Kosovo has one of the best drafted constitutions accompanied with high 
democratic standards focusing on separation of powers, secularism, rule of law, human 
rights, minority rights, et cetera. However, the problem is its implementation.   
Kosovo is small, yet symbolically very important. The political situation can 
escalate easily and disseminate beyond the country and spread. The West learned their 
lesson in Bosnia and Herzegovina first with Srebrenica and second with Dayton Accords. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina have three presidents coming from the three largest ethnic 
groups and is divided into two autonomous entities: federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Republic of Serbia. Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats—largest ethnic 
groups—challenge the legitimacy of each other as well as the legitimacy of the state itself. 
Kosovo, on the other hand, is the most homogeneous society in the Balkans and 
considering the death, suffrage and devastation it has suffered over the years, Kosovo’s 
independence was the best alternative to end the story of the death of Yugoslavia. As 
such, the Western nations strongly supported the declaration of independence. The first 
independence recognitions came from Western countries and Kosovo neighboring 
nations. Albania, US, UK, France, Germany, Turkey, former Yugoslav republics, Japan, 
South Korea, Canada and many more recognized Kosovo within weeks. However, five 
EU member states rejected the idea. Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Spain and Slovakia do not 
recognize Kosovo as an independent state and their opinion remains the same a decade 
afterwards. With the independence of Kosovo, the redrawing of the post-Yugoslav map 
was completed, but Kosovo still has a long way to go. Kosovo is in search of sovereignty, 
recognition and integration.  
The West intervened in Kosovo but was also determined to assist the youngest 
country in Europe to build strong and sustainable institutions. According to Francis 
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Fukuyama state-building means “the creation of new government instructions and the 
strengthening of existing ones.”182 Simply put, state-building means improving the well-
being of citizens in all spheres. The international community was not fully committed to 
install a rule of law and order in Kosovo, they came to work and enjoy the allowances 
and left without learning the local language and culture essential to better understand 
the problems and initiate change. The UNMIK staff was overpopulated, and often not 
accountable. As such, it had negatively inspired unaccountability and stimulated a 
culture of corruption. What the UNMIK should be mostly accredited for is its neutral 
approach towards the status of Kosovo, organizing elections and the establishment of 
fiscal policy and tax system. When Kosovo declared independence most of its powers 
were transferred to the government of Kosovo and the European Union Rule of Law 
Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) which was established in 2008 and operates under the 
umbrella of UNMIK. The EULEX deployed a combination of civilian and police 
personnel with the purpose of introducing a rule of law culture, improving negotiations 
vis-à-vis Serbia and strengthening local institutions. Kosovo is the largest per capita 
recipient of EU financial aid in the world and is home to the largest civilian crisis 
management mission ever launched by the EU. The EULEX focuses on providing support 
to Kosovo’s rule of law to strengthen the chain of criminal justice, with emphasis on 
fighting political interference and monitoring sensitive cases. The mission has executive 
powers and works as an independent body from the Republic of Kosovo and is 
accountable to the EU member states. However, the mission’s mandate is required by the 
Kosovo parliament to be approved on a two-year basis. Since its establishment, the 
EULEX mandate has been extended consistently.  
Although the EULEX helped build capacities, notably in customs and assisting the 
Kosovo police; the judiciary however, has made minor progress. In 2012, the European 
Court of Auditors reported that EULEX has not been sufficiently effective. For instance, 
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EU member states have seconded an insufficient and unqualified staff to EULEX.183 The 
mission was shaken two times. The first scandal broke out in 2014 when the EULEX 
prosecutor Mariah Bamieh accused one of the judges of EULEX for taking bribes. Three 
years afterwards, Malcolm Simmons the chief judge of EULEX, resigned and unleashed 
a string of accusations against the organization. But EULEX then revealed that Simmons 
himself was the subject of several investigations into alleged serious wrongdoing. The 
most expensive mission of the EU is failing to deliver. Ironically, the mission in charge of 
fighting corruption experienced internal corruption scandals. Huge investments, minor 
progress and corruption scandals damaged EU’s reputation in Kosovo. Today, 
corruption and organized crime remains high. In fact, according to Progress Reports from 
European Commission, since 2008, there has been an increase in corruption in Kosovo.184 
The judiciary continues to suffer from inefficiency, lack of transparency and political 
interference. EULEX’s biggest failure is the negligence and incompetence when it comes 
to most serious crimes.185 EULEX is not the one to be blamed for corruption in Kosovo, 
but EULEX failed to reach its primary objectives of its mission, fight corruption and 
strengthen the rule of law.  
The independence of Kosovo was met with an immediate reaction in Serbia. The 
Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox church stated that the Serbs will never let Kosovo leave. 
Serbia issued warrant arrests for “treason” against Kosovo Albanian politicians. Serbia 
also declared that all ambassadors would be withdrawn from countries that would 
recognize the independence of Kosovo. Local mobs attacked the US embassy and German 
embassy in Belgrade, ridiculously some of them attacked one of the McDonald’s in the 
capital. As a result of this huge opposition, the first major post-independence challenge 
came in October 2008. Serbia—with the help of Russia—strongly opposed Kosovo’s 
                                                 
183 European Court of Auditors, Rule of Law Assistance to Kosovo not Sufficiently Effective, Press Release 
ECA/12/41, October 30, 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ECA-12-41_en.htm?locale=en (accessed 
August 29 2017). 
184 Kosovo under UNSCR 1244/99 2009 Progress Report, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010, 
https://www.mei-ks.net/repository/docs/ks_rapport_2009_en.pdf. 
185 Andrea Lorenzo Capussela, State-building in Kosovo: Democracy, Corruption and EU in the Balkans (Kosovo: KOHA 
Press, 2015), p. 239. 
82 
 
unilateral declaration of independence condemning it as an illegal act under international 
law. The Serbian policy towards Kosovo failed, so they decided to move towards legal 
procedures. After enormous pressure from Serbia, the UN General Assembly resolved 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to render an advisory opinion on the legality of 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Two years afterwards, the ICJ decided that 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence was not in violation with either general principles 
of international law—which do not prohibit unilateral declarations of independence—
nor, of specific international law—in particular Resolution 1244—which did not define 
the final status process for Kosovo. The ICJ decision was a huge blow for Serbia, which 
considered that it had a strong legal argument even if the political realities on the ground 
were moving in a different direction. The court’s decision was a triumph for Kosovo, the 
West and pro-European voices in Serbia and the EU. 
However, Kosovo did not manage to utilize the favorable decision of the ICJ. 
Kosovo received only a symbolic number of recognitions and memberships in 
international organizations. Kosovo failed to take advantage of the positive court 
decision to convince the five members of the EU to recognize its independence. Moreover, 
the vast majority of South American and Asian nations still do not recognize Kosovo as 
an independent country. Some may argue that accepting Kosovo’s independence is solely 
a domestic issue of countries; however, Kosovo failed to join crucial intergovernmental 
organizations such as UN and Interpol. Kosovo’s attempt to join UNESCO, failed only 
three votes short. UNESCO is one of the most important specialized agencies within UN 
focusing on education, science and culture. Ironically, after the ICJ decision, Kosovo’s 
statehood has had some fundamental downsides. Serbia boycotted constantly regional 
meetings where Kosovo was present. In 2012, the Kosovo government agreed to add the 
footnote on its name “Kosovo*” to represent itself without the authority of the UNMIK. 
The footnote applied to the asterisk reads “this designation is without prejudice to 
positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo 
declaration of independence.” Moreover, point seven says, “hosts of meetings will be 
encouraged to avoid the display of national symbols except for their own and those of 
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the EU, taking into account the statutes of relevant organizations.”186 Since then, the 
Kosovo government have been participating in international meetings with a footnote 
(asterisk) referring to Resolution 1244 (status-neutrality). The Kosovo’s chief negotiator 
Edita Tahiri claimed that the asterisk would soon disappear “like a snowflake.” Three 
years afterwards, Kosovo signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the 
EU—a major step towards European integration. However, the contractual agreement, 
between the EU and Kosovo presents the former with the asterisk.187 In 2018, the 
snowflake looks more like a snowball going down the hill accumulating more snow, 
ready to hit the ground. Instead of enforcing sovereignty, the government of Kosovo 
came to a point of questioning their sovereignty, removing the prefix: republic and 
adding a suffix: an asterisk to satisfy Serbia’s needs. 
The ICJ’s verdict pushed Serbia and the EU to submit a resolution to the UN calling 
for negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, facilitated by Brussels. The resolution 
successfully passed and negotiations started in 2011 focusing on three key areas: regional 
cooperation, freedom of movement and rule of law. The first rounds of negations begun 
with light subjects such as economic cooperation, telecommunications, customs, civil 
records and freedom of movement. Belgrade has agreed to provide the birth and 
marriage certificates and Kosovars travel to Serbia, but only if they buy the special license 
plates, because the Kosovar plates include the “Republic of Kosovo,” something Belgrade 
does not want to see in its territory. Serbia does not recognize Kosovar passports but 
allows them to cross the border using identification cards. Thus far, the most 
controversial agreement has been the Association/Community of Serb majority-municipalities 
in Kosovo.188 First of all, there is no official document which shows signatures by the 
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representatives of both governments. Second, the municipality is based on mono-ethnic 
lines which undermines the multi-ethnic identity of the republic of Kosovo. And third, 
the association will have its own statute, president and assembly and would have full 
overview of the areas such as education, health, urban planning and economic 
development, allowing them to exercise their powers collectively. The association has 
been met with huge opposition by opposition parties, media and civil society in Kosovo, 
on the basis that is unconstitutional as it discriminates other ethnic groups. The 
agreement was sent to the Kosovo Constitutional Court. The court decided that the 
general principles of the Association were not entirely in compliance with the spirit of 
the constitution. The Agreement was allegedly agreed by the government representatives 
of both Kosovo and Serbia but remains unratified by the parliament of Kosovo due to 
domestic discord. Currently, the agreement is in limbo.  
In general, the EU facilitated dialogue to normalize relations between both 
countries has been marathonic. Six years have since passed and Serbia still doesn’t 
recognize Kosovo’s independence, defining the region as an integral part of Serbia.189 The 
principal problem of this dialogue is that it is unfair and artificial. Kosovo and Serbia are 
not treated as equal parties. Kosovo is not recognized as an independent state by the EU, 
on the other hand, Serbia has opened new chapters for EU membership. This is extremely 
dangerous because Serbia uses the negotiations with Kosovo as a precedent. In fact, 
Serbia uses two cards: Russia and Kosovo. Maintaining closer relations with Russia 
frightens the EU, not recognizing Kosovo’s independence shows the inclination for more 
carrots. There is no need for such a dialogue because Serbia must meet certain conditions 
beforehand. First, Serbia must issue an apology to the war victims of former Yugoslavia 
and pay war reparations. Second, Serbia must remove Kosovo from its constitution. 
Third, Serbia has to recognize Kosovo and prove that it is in accordance with good 
friendship standards of the EU. 
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The second major test for Kosovo came in 2010. Following a vote of no-confidence, 
the parliament of Kosovo dissolved and elections were held. The election was seriously 
hampered as a result of several irregularities and frauds coined as “industrial theft of 
vote.” Some polling stations exceeded the number of signatures in the voters' books. 
Voting turnout in some PDK strongholds topped 94 percent, although records show 
turnout had been only 51 percent as late as 16:00 o’clock, a number that is statistically 
impossible. Double-voting and other irregularities were present.190 The 2010 elections 
was a huge step backwards as it seriously damaged Kosovo’s reputation and eliminated 
the opportunity for new parties to participate in the parliament. The electoral threshold 
in Kosovo is five percent, any party that fails to reach the five percent cannot be 
represented in the parliament. The West turned a blind eye for the sake of stabilocracy, 
prioritizing stability over democracy and progress. 
At the end of 2017, the Council of Europe adopted a report drafted by its Human 
Rights Rapporteur, Richard Marty. The report claims that Hashim Thaci a prominent 
leader of KLA who currently holds the office of the president is part of a criminal network 
responsible of smuggling weapons and dungs during the Kosovo War. Moreover, the 
report allegations claimed that Serb civilians were kidnapped and transported to Albania 
for the purpose of harvesting their organs in order to sell them in the black market.191 
Thaci’s credibility was seriously damaged. In a matter of days, he ordered the Kosovo 
Police Special Forces to seize control of the customs stations in Jarinje, North Kosovo. The 
Special Forces were attacked by a local mob of local Serbs. The situation escalated with 
an exchange of fire and one policemen was shot dead. Thaci’s maneuver was reckless and 
irresponsible, but it paid off. He regained his credibility, especially among the nationalist 
contagion. Although the incident was condemned by the international community as an 
irresponsible and dangerous action, the West pushed EULEX to move its staff into the 
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North and ordered KFOR to remove the barricades.192 Internationally, Thaci lost respect 
and no Western leader showed the willingness to meet with him. Locally, the Kosovo 
Albanians believed that Marty’s report was pro-Serb, others believed that during the 
conflict there were no adequate conditions for organ smuggling due to the need for 
sophisticated medical technology. Internationally, people such as Denis MacShane who 
served as Minister of Britain for Europe, believed that Marty’s report Illicit Trafficking in 
Human Organs in Kosovo was designed to “maximize headlines” and serve the Serbo-
Russian propaganda to create an atmosphere hostile to Kosovo.193  
Regardless, Marty’s report produced a hurricane in Kosovo and put enormous 
pressure on the West. Incapable of indicting former KLA fighters, the international 
community pushed Kosovo to establish a war court that will try former senior KLA 
fighters responsible for crimes against humanity during and after the war from the period 
of 1998 to 1999. The alleged crimes include killings, abductions, illegal detentions and 
sexual violence. The war court was rejected massively by Kosovars and its establishment. 
The opposition has argued that the court is unjust towards Kosovars, being the victims 
of war and that Serbia has not taken responsibility to accept and apologize to the victims 
of war. However, in Kosovo, when Americans speak, Kosovars listen. During her visit in 
Kosovo, US diplomat Victoria Nuland warned, “if you don’t create this court yourselves, 
if you don’t take your own steps for justice…the international community will do it 
instead.”194 The court, otherwise known as the “Specialist Chambers” was amended by 
the 2/3 of the Kosovo parliament. The court will operate under Kosovo’s jurisdiction; 
however, its staff will be international and will be independent from the Kosovo 
judiciary.  The court is highly unpopular among Kosovo Albanians because it is perceived 
as biased as it will only deal with cases of former KLA fighters. While it is true that there 
were some KLA fighters who committed crimes, the ones who were accused before, all 
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voluntarily surrendered to ICTY. This is the next major challenge facing Kosovo’s 
statehood, the outcome of which remains to be seen. 
Blaming only the West for the slow progress of Kosovo is myopic. Insufficient 
domestic demand for institutions or institutional reform is the single most important 
obstacle to institutional development in poor states.195 A decade after the declaration of 
independence, Kosovo still faces numerous problems that have confronted post-
communist and post-conflict countries of Europe. Kosovo statehood is based on the 
principles of liberal democracy, free market economy and euro-Atlantic integration. 
State-building in Kosovo has not failed, but it is in the process of failing. Kosovo is lagging 
and is in the group of countries that are still in transition and have hybrid regimes.196 
The standard of living, which was higher a few years ago, is now for many people 
not very different from what they were used to during the notorious years of deprivation 
under sanctions and hyper-inflation in the 1990s.197 The average monthly income is 
around €350—the lowest in the region—making Kosovo the least developed part of the 
whole Balkans, and the third poorest country in Europe. Economic growth is slow, but 
unemployment remains high. Kosovars spend a lot, but produce little. The economy is 
largely dependent on remittances from diaspora and foreign aid. Furthermore, there is a 
substantial resource gap problem, approximately 1/3 of the population is unemployed, 
half of them are under the age of 30, majority women. Graduates in Kosovo face years 
waiting to find a job and this includes people with master’s degrees. Nepotism, 
unsuitable qualifications, lack of jobs, and the failure to meet the market’s needs are some 
of the main reasons.198 Education has also shown poor performances over the years. In 
2015, the results of an international education evaluation, the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) placed Kosovo in the bottom five 
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internationally and last regionally.199 The assessment confirms the argument about 
deficiencies in the educational system where the majority of students fail to demonstrate 
basic skills. High unemployment has impelled many Kosovars to pursue their future 
abroad. Kosovo has witnessed its biggest exodus since independence in the beginning of 
2015. According to some estimates, more than 50,000 Kosovars—roughly three percent of 
the total population—left the country to pursue a better life in the developed nations of 
the EU.200 
When it comes to minority relations in Kosovo there has been some progress, yet 
Kosovo Serbs live separated in Northern part of Mitrovica, the demarcation line is the 
Mitrovica bridge. The South of Mitrovica is populated by Albanians whereas the North 
by Serbs. Many Serbs do not see themselves as part of Kosovo as it exists, they reject 
Kosovo authorities, have a different school curriculum, refuse to obtain Kosovo ID’s and 
driving license plates, don’t pay electricity bill’s, et cetera. The shocking assassination of 
Oliver Ivanovic, a prominent Kosovo Serb politician has troubled the waters, although 
there are indications that the murder was not ethnically motivated. On the other side, 
Kosovo Albanians are happy to live in their independent state, but do not feel the new 
republic represents their identity. The flag of Kosovo has a blue background and displays 
six stars (representing six ethnic communities) over a golden Kosovo map. People of 
Kosovo do not feel the colors nor the symbols of the flag represent their true identity, as 
such the flag has failed to resonate. The national anthem is called “Europa” and has no 
lyrics in order to avoid nationalistic language disagreements. Many people do not even 
recognize the melody. The Kosovar national identity is weak among Kosovo Albanians 
whereas Kosovo Serbs reject the idea. Moreover, other communities such as Roma, 
Ashkali and Egyptian communities live in very bad conditions, in other terms, ghettos. 
More emphasis is needed to rebuild trust and reconciliation, including engagement with 
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communities, youth and women, as well as overcoming obstacles related to religious and 
ethnic identity.  
The government of Kosovo is ineffective and corruption is widespread.  
Thousands of former KLA guerillas failed to integrate in Kosovo’s economy. 
Alternatively, some of them found easier ways to make money using connections in the 
government and illegal channels such as gun and drug smuggling and usury. The 
presence of these people seriously questions the legitimacy of the state. Kosovo is 
currently experiencing Al Capone’s America. The Kosovo judiciary is weak. One reason 
for this is that it lacks the “Anti-Mafia law” which means confiscating the wealth of 
criminals and most importantly it lacks the political will to prosecute the high-profile 
violators. Organized crime damages enormously the functioning of the society, it impacts 
the economic growth and declines the willingness for foreign direct investment. The 
government is the country’s largest employer and public enterprises generate the largest 
amount of advertising revenue. It has become a tradition for the government of Kosovo 
to employ family relatives and loyalists.201 It often employs government critics—usually 
journalists and civil society representatives—in order to co-opt them. Prominent figures 
are thus evaporating from the public debate. The new government consists of 21 cabinet 
ministers and more than 70 deputy ministers, the largest government cabinet in the 
Balkans. Such a system requires a significant amount of money to perpetuate and yet still 
maintains corruption at all levels. In addition, politicians have incomes that do not 
correspond to their formal state incomes. The current Prime Minister and former KLA 
commander Ramush Haradinaj made a decision by the end of 2017 to double his monthly 
income from €1500 to €2950 and increased significantly the income of ministers and 
deputy ministers.202 Next year, the opposition challenged this decision by addressing the 
Kosovo Constitutional Court claiming that the Prime Minister’s decision to increase is in 
violation with the constitution. It will take several months for a decision to be made. 
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Kosovo finds it very difficult to join international and regional organizations. 
Kosovo is isolated, making it the only European country that does not have a visa 
liberation in Europe, which means no visa-free traveling in the Schengen area. The 
Schengen is an area comprising EU member states that have officially abolished passport 
and all other types of border control at their mutual borders. The EU has publicly stated 
that fight against corruption and the ratification of border demarcation with Montenegro 
are the two last criteria for visa liberalization. The first one is a continuous process and 
very hard to define whether it is met or not, the latter has not been met yet. The border 
demarcation agreement has been signed by the foreign ministers of both countries and 
has been ratified in the Montenegrin parliament, but not by the Kosovar one. The 
agreement exacerbated tensions between the government and the opposition inside and 
outside the parliament. The government of Kosovo is facing enormous obstacles as most 
of Kosovo parliament have committed itself to overrun the agreement. The agreement 
has become significantly unpopular, a substantial number of members in the parliament 
believe the agreement will lead to a loss of territory for Kosovo, as such it is not worth 
giving land for the sake of visa liberalization. The opposition remains the same despite 
EU’s and US’s calls to ratify the agreement as it is. The former government has tried 
several times to ratify the agreement but was met with massive, often violent opposition. 
The biggest opposition party Self-determination Movement (VV) have organized a series 
of protests in the streets and parliament. In the parliament the situation escalated to the 
point of releasing tear gas on several occasions. The border demarcation has remained 
non-ratified for more than two years now and is seriously questioning Kosovo’s 
relationship with the EU.  
This event is a marking point in Kosovo politics. The government of Kosovo for 
the first time since independence has refused to follow the EU’s guidance on such an 
important issue and has created a tendency of rushed and irrational decision-making 
which has undermined the relationship with its international supporters. The adventure 
continued when President Thaci initiated a process of transforming KSF into a national 
army through a draft law and not by amending the constitution as required. Thaci’s 
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initiative has faced major opposition from the Kosovo opposition and civil society, the 
EU, US and NATO; and was finally halted. Moreover, President Thaci and Prime Minister 
Haradinaj—both former KLA members—have attempted to suspend the Specialist 
Chambers that was ratified by the Kosovo parliament in 2015. The court is viewed by 
world powers as a vital prerequisite for regional reconciliation, but the moves to halt the 
court before it has even started have infuriated Kosovo’s international supporters.203 The 
problem is that former KLA fighters are governing the country and there are many more 
in leading positions. These people fear prosecution. The government attempts have been 
unsuccessful so far and it seems that the international pressure is going to prevail this 
time. 
This recent atmosphere of cacophony is seriously putting in danger the future of 
Kosovo. Small states such as Kosovo can only achieve their political aims through 
diplomacy and maintaining good relations with their allies. Kosovo risks losing this path 
of influence, as its limited diplomacy is being quickly degenerated. Kosovo needs to 
prove itself as a reliable partner by respecting its international obligations and keep a 
close relationship with its partners. 
On the other side of the coin, the path of Kosovo has seen good days as well. 
Kosovo has proven capable of surpassing expectations with its achievements. A World 
Bank report ranks Kosovo as one of the best countries in the world to do business with, 
having simple procedures to start-up businesses, surrounded by youngster’s fluency in 
English and eagerness to learn. The number of students has dramatically increased and 
the number of illiterate people is in decline. The government is heavily investing in 
infrastructure and allocating grants for start-up businesses. In a matter of years, Kosovo 
has managed to gain more than 110 state recognitions and become part of seminal 
international bodies and organizations such as World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund, Central European Free Trade Agreement, European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, international sports federations, et cetera. In 2015, Shok, a short drama film 
                                                 




from Kosovo that was based on a true story was nominated for an Oscars. The next year, 
Kosovo participated in its first Olympics and won a golden medal. Majlinda Kelmendi 
managed to win the first place in Judo and proved to the world what Kosovo was capable 
of. Kosovo has achieved another milestone, in 2017, Kosovo held its first ever official 
LGBT Pride Parade in the capital Pristina, celebrating inclusion and diversity.  
Kosovo’s path has been relatively successful and problematic. Kosovo has a long 
way to go in order to consolidate its sovereignty and institutions. Offering new 
opportunities and boosting the economy is essential. Improving the rule of law and 
respecting human rights will further determine its path towards European integration. 
Kosovo needs more women and youth in leading positions, subsequently opening the 
door to a new cadre of leaders. The improvement of inter-ethnic relations between 
Albanians and Serbs is crucial but remains challenging. There cannot be and stability 
without establishing an inclusive society where all communities live and work in 
harmony with each other. On the international level, Kosovo must be a member of the 
UN and reach a final deal with Serbia. Further, membership in the Council of Europe and 
Interpol would be good steps to improve the rule of law and security in the country. 
Kosovo can only achieve such milestones through maintaining a close relationship with 
its supporters, especially the West. Kosovo has made some progress but has a long way 
to go. The next few years will be vital to witness whether Kosovo will be able to overcome 
all these challenges and become a member of the family of nations or fall into the group 











LESSONS FROM KOSOVO 
 
“Kosovo is the best example to show what happens when the international community, led by 
America, engages to defend its values and interests.” 
—James N. Mattis, 2017204 
Every conflict and war is unique; however, lessons must be drawn from past experiences. 
Below are listed some of the most crucial lessons from the Kosovo intervention:  
Pre-Intervention Lessons 
Sovereignty is no excuse for tyranny. Sovereignty and therefore legitimacy could 
no longer be automatically conferred on the de facto power holder in a country 
Sovereignty entails obligations, one is not to slaughter your own people. The 
establishment of the ICTY show that atrocities are not only the concern of local authorities 
and states will be held accountable for war time actions. The Westphalian system is no 
longer an adequate framework for international relations. Now there is more consensus 
within the international community over principles of human rights and rule of law. 
The conflicts in Yugoslavia have proved that sanctions without a commitment to 
use force are a waste of time. Sanctions affect the economy but they almost never reach a 
desired outcome. Sanctions can have a boomerang effect, they may strengthen the 
position of the oppressor and further weaken the opposition. The ones that suffers the 
most are the citizens and refugees whose lives further deteriorate from bad economic 
conditions. Sanctions are more efficient when there is a commitment to use force. 
Intervention should, first of all exhaust all diplomatic options including 
negotiations and discussions at the UNSC. This way, cooperation among states will 
become realistic. Failing to achieve consensus at the UNSC would create better incentives 
for cooperation. When countries agree for intervention there must be a concrete plan on 
how military action will be undertaken. Humanitarian intervention cannot be initiated 
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without considering both moral and practical factors. The moral dimension is the basis 
for the international coordination. The only time you can legitimize the intervention is by 
using the humanitarian argument. When the international community decides to 
intervene, it must push hard for humanitarian arguments. Often, the imperative to stop 
ethnic cleansing and violence will change the opinion of those who oppose humanitarian 
intervention. Meaningful humanitarian intervention does not threaten world order; 
rather, it vindicates the fundamental principles for which the UN was created. 
Prior to intervention there must be beforehand information regarding the history 
and geography of the region’s complexity, including its cultural differences, religious 
affiliations, ethnic homogeneity or heterogeneity. There has to be a legitimate footprint 
related to circumstances and local conditions. If citizens of the state accept the outcome 
of the war, it is more likely that you will gain the support of the locals. In the Balkans, 
fascism does not simply resurface once in a while before sinking again, as it happens in 
Western democracies. Centuries of violence, hatred and uncertainty fuel the Balkans 
nationalism; once that reappears, it has fatal consequences. Thus, history, geography and 
culture are crucial elements to examine beforehand. 
Intervention means choosing a side. When the international community decides 
to intervene internationally, it must first of all choose which side they are going to 
support. Intervention means that some people will die, so it is essential to know 
beforehand who will govern afterwards and who is the group that you are going to 
support. Making peace means determining how the war ends. Not taking sides will 
extend the war and will cost more lives. For instance, the “safe areas” in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, created more mess and chaos rather than solution. The Bosnian Serbs took 
advantage of this opportunity to expand their conquest. As Richard Betts puts it, “limited 
intervention may end a war...trying to have it both ways usually block peace by doing 
enough to keep either belligerent from defeating the other, but not enough to make them 
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stop trying. And the attempt to have it both ways has brought the UN and the US to 
varying degrees of grief in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia and Haiti.”205 
The powerful nations are not always the ones who design policy-making, in many 
occasions the small countries are the ones who push for its design. Kosovo is a good 
example of how a small country can define policy-making. KLA maneuvers and 
intensification of attacks pushed Milosevic to retaliate. When Milosevic responded 
brutally, it undermined all diplomatic attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully. The 
array of events portrayed the malevolence of Milosevic and put the credibility of 
intergovernmental organizations and Western nations in jeopardy. Belgrade’s lack of 
political will and the increase of attacks created the foundation for intervention. 
Intervention Lessons 
NATO proved that it could exist without an existential threat. The NATO air 
campaign in Kosovo against Yugoslavia is historically significant, because it marks the 
first military attack on a sovereign nation for other purposes than defense. The air 
campaign was both a successful humanitarian intervention and cooperation among allies 
ensuring a safe and stable environment. Furthermore, Kosovo intervention proved that 
NATO remains critical on balancing Russia. When the West united as one, Russia 
remained powerless to influence the events that followed. 
Relying heavily or only on air power does not guarantee success, especially when 
you deal with a mountainous terrain. Firing on a dessert is much easier rather than towns 
and cities. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo utilized an impersonal technology in order to 
assure Western nations that technology can be used to wage war with minimal or no 
casualties. Although two American pilots died during a training mission in Albania, not 
a single NATO soldier died in direct hostile in Kosovo, but civilians did. By flying at 
medium altitude, NATO reduced the danger of its pilots but increased the risks for 
civilians on the ground. It is estimated that around 500 Albanian and Serbian civilians 
died during the air campaign. Overall, considering the discursive standards of war these 
                                                 




numbers are minor. Thus, the mission in Kosovo has set a high standard for future 
operations.  
Rejecting the idea of ground forces totally, will create a sense of comfort for the 
oppressor. Since the very beginning, NATO allies ruled out the deployment of ground 
forces. Further, they did not hesitate to state their position publicly. President Clinton 
stated before the campaign, “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war.”206 
This helped on reducing Milosevic’s uncertainty believing that he could survive a couple 
of weeks of bombardment. Had the West remained silent, Milosevic would have 
probably felt more threatened and admit defeat faster. Excluding military options, at least 
in public, can have consequences for the overall operation. Nevertheless, NATO 
prevailed without the help of ground forces proving most of its critics wrong, that war 
can be waged without considering the option of ground forces. 
The Kosovo war has demonstrated how dependent Europeans are on the US to 
carry out even limited military interventions in their own neighborhood—let alone to 
defend themselves against a theoretical attack from a hostile power such as Russia. The 
American use of force and military technology was decisive throughout the air campaign. 
Today, the role of the US is diminishing but it still has a large role to play, the US spends 
more on its military (more than $600 billion) than next seven countries combined. As 
such, the US should act decisively in future conflicts. A symbolic use of force has never 
achieved anything, but frustration on the other side. Half-choices or half-measures 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina) are not solutions, instead they may make things even worse, 
inspire more violence and lead more domestic casualties between ethnic groups. The 
intervention in Kosovo is often portrayed as American military power; however, it is the 
European countries that invested most of their time and resources in ensuring post-war 
stability and fostering state-building.  
One should not exaggerate the contribution of public diplomacy to the victory. As 
in any modern war, at times public diplomacy strategy was swept along (or aside) by the 
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tide of events and particularly by the media images of those events. After the massacre 
of Racak and during the first two weeks of bombing, US public diplomacy, far from being 
a carefully planned strategy, was largely reactive and improvisational—at Racak, it was 
improvised literally on the spot. But that did not prevent it from being successful. A 
crucial element of that success was a keen sense of how Westerners viewed Milosevic and 
the forces he commanded, which enabled US spokesmen to use his most blood-curdling 
atrocities to rally rather than dishearten Western public opinion. 
Media is also a crucial factor. When the Srebrenica genocide happened, the world 
was shocked. Western citizens were stunned to see thousands of bodies appear in their 
national newspapers and on local TV stations. They demanded answers and advocated 
to stop the murder. By the time the situation in Kosovo had started to deteriorate, people 
were already filled with anger and disappointment. Hundreds of international journalists 
and OSCE staff were reporting daily from the ground. This made people shape their 
opinion leaning more towards intervention. However, the presence of media also meant 
that mistakes had to be minimal. The incident with the Chinese embassy shows that one 
mistake could have fatal consequences and seriously question the mission’s credibility. 
Multilateralism, too, is essential for successful humanitarian intervention. The 
problem is that keeping everyone together is difficult. During the air campaign in 
Kosovo, every decision had to go through all NATO member states and decisions had to 
be considered. Similarly, after the intervention, European nations had different 
approaches when it came to solving Kosovo’s final status. The EU does not have a 
compatible foreign policy. Each country represents its own interests. Kosovo’s 
independence shows that although most of the EU states have recognized Kosovo, Spain 
has diminished the hopes of a coherent EU foreign policy stand in regard to the Western 
Balkans. 
Kosovo was a powerful precedent for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, 
but not everyone shared this view. The intervention in Kosovo has backfired and 
generated dangerous tensions between Russia and the West. The opponents questioned 
the validity of the intervention and did not hesitate to call it an “act of aggression.” 
98 
 
Regardless if the intervention was legal or legitimate, it produced polarized discussions 
among nations and different viewpoints among experts. Thus, the war in Kosovo, is most 
probably the first and last war waged by NATO without the legitimacy of a UN mandate. 
Post-Intervention Lessons 
Winning the war is relatively easy, keeping the peace is hard. State-building is 
essential to maintain stability. After intervention, an atmosphere of safety and peace must 
be maintained. This way refugees will start pouring in, people will start reconstructing 
their damaged properties and the international community will start funding capital 
projects. But, in order to initiate reforms, the newly elected government has to be 
compatible with the international community plans. Otherwise, an undesired outcome is 
more likely to happen as the new cadre of leaders, full of political ambitions, may 
undermine democracy and pursue personal interests at the expense of their subjects.  
The riots in Mitrovica shows that once a conflict is over, it takes only a spark of 
nationalism to resurface before the situation escalates again. The presence of security 
forces must be at the state of readiness at all times in order to avoid any ethnic clashes. 
The division of Mitrovica demarcated by KFOR was a mistake that haunts Kosovo society 
even today. Northern Kosovo is a place where Kosovo authorities have limited access 
and local Serbs reject official documents. The number of illegal activities including drug 
and gun smuggling and movie-like assassinations and other crimes has halted the 
progress of Kosovo. This is an important lesson, because once the international troops 
move in a post-conflict country, the very first days are essential. A mistake such as the 
division of towns or cities can be very problematic to undo in the future. 
State-building requires substantial investment. Since the end of Cold War, Kosovo 
has the second-highest level of assistance on a per capita basis and ranks fourth in terms 
of total assistance ($800 per resident), yet Kosovo has not managed to transform itself into 
a well-functioning and prospering democratic society.207 However, economic growth 
varies from three to five percent, which is a slow progress but not enough considering 
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the potential Kosovo has. The large-scale investments made in Kosovo shows that 
economy can be restored rapidly. Promoting the rule of law is one of the most difficult 
aspects of democratic reform. In comparison, designing constitutions and holding 
elections is comparably easy. Amending and designing laws is relatively easy, however, 
implementing them is very hard. 
Initiate construction not reconstruction. In other words, transfer knowledge and 
resources and do not start everything from scratch. The international community knows 
how to supply government services; what it knows much less well is how to create self-
sustaining indigenous institutions.208 When the international community commits to 
state-building it should be aware that it is not arriving with bricks, trucks, cranes and 
architects. Instead, the international community should help the locals to build their own 
home and assist them with the best practices in order to operate it on their own.209 The 
Kosovars understood that they were not capable of creating their own institutions; thus, 
they welcomed knowledge and learned everything from an amalgamation of different 
missions in Kosovo. 
The UN helped to facilitate and construct local institutions and managed to 
provide minimal functions such as providing public goods, relative security, order, 
public health, fiscal policy and macroeconomic management. However, it failed to 
improve the quality of education, tackle poverty and inequality, guarantee 
environmental protection, boost sustainable economic growth and effective governance. 
The international community has helped enormously by investing in infrastructure 
projects and human capital, providing trainings, classes, scholarships in order to better 
prepare Kosovo citizens for the future. The problem with the UN was that it did not 
manage to create a system of monitoring the institutions and punishing those who misuse 
the public offices and this has installed a culture of nepotism. Building efficient 
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institutions is a key feature of a state, therefore state-building requires strong institutions; 
however, institution building requires both substance and time to be successful.  
While Kosovo is a parliamentary republic with a multi-party system and free 
elections, it falls behind in terms of substance or substantive democracy. But, democracy 
is easier said than done and not every society is ready for it. Democracy requires a relative 
level of educated people and a sizable middle class who are willing to embrace 
democratic ideals. Most importantly, these societies must have a culture of tolerance and 
a dose of secular divide. Formal democracy is a prerequisite for producing substantive 
democracy. Strong institutions need time and substance, while creating them is easy, 
maintaining or improving them is rather difficult. There is no quality without quantity, 
being the newest country in Europe, Kosovo demonstrates that post-conflict countries 
need more time to consolidate their institutions. 
Kosovo shows that uncertainty over the final status can push for democratic 
reforms. Democracy is the foundation of state-building. Democratic countries are 
characterized with better education, higher standard of living and rule of law. Democracy 
seem to enact economic reforms that are conducive to growth.210 They seem to raise more 
taxes but tend to invest more on public goods related to health and schooling, which may 
contribute to growth.211 In order to be efficient, democracy has to be liberal. There is a 
distinction between democracy and liberalism. Germany for instance is both liberal and 
democratic, Iran on the other hand is democratic but not liberal. It is enormously 
important to establish basic principles of democracy based on liberal values, because 
elections in post-conflict countries sometimes can have a counter-effect and bring 
authoritarian individuals to power. Democratic countries are less likely to fight each 
other, they do not engage in conflicts and terrorist actions, neither do they produce 
refugees. Liberal democracy has proven to be the best system of governance because it is 
based on individual freedoms, justice, dignity and respect. As such, building a state 
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means building a democracy. Building democracy produces peace and sustainability and 
benefits the region and beyond.  
Intervention must have an exit strategy. Staying too long does not guarantee success, 
while leaving early ensures failure. After the intervention, the US established Camp 
Bondsteel. The camp can hold up to 7,000 soldiers which makes it the largest military 
base in the Balkans. Building a military base sends an important message. The 
establishment of this base and the presence of troops demonstrates an enduring US 
commitment to security not just in Kosovo but in the Balkans as a whole. For Kosovars, 
it is important to see the white stars on the blue background and white and red stripes 
























STILL THE INDISPENSABLE NATION? 
 
“I believe that America has enormous strengths and that the new world will not throw up a new 
superpower but rather a diversity of forces that Washington can navigate and even help direct. 
But still, as the rest of world rises, in purely economic terms, America will experience relative 
decline. As others grow faster, its share of the pie will be smaller.”  
—Fareed Zakaria, 2008212 
The age of permanent wars produced the Cold War. The end of the Cold War 
ended the age of permanent containment but produced the age of permanent crisis. 
Crises are unexpected events characterized by a short life span and short decision-making 
process. The significance of crisis is that they occur periodically. The rise of the US to 
power has made it possible to define the agenda and change in world’s politics. However, 
this has started to change. We are entering the post-American World as Fareed Zakaria 
argued in his book. As other nations are rising, the US role is weakening. The world is 
becoming more polycentric and multipolar, but the US remains the dominant power. The 
international system is shifting towards a hybrid system, “uni-multipolarity,” one major 
power and several powers.213 The interesting fact is that all the emerging nations are non-
Western, meaning they do not necessarily share liberal democratic values. Nations such 
as China and India are increasing rapidly.  
Nevertheless, America continues to have an important role to play in the world. 
For the US and for the world, it is crucial to remain committed and engaged, especially 
in the fragile regions. The truth is, there is no conflict prevention, humanitarian 
intervention, peace-making process, post-conflict reconstruction, without the 
involvement of the US, as only America has the resources and the inclination to maintain 
stability and peace in the world. American supremacy and liberal world order are 
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intertwined. The US needs to pursue effective policies in order to maintain and support 
fragile or young democracies by assisting them continuously. 
Decisions to use force require a long-term commitment to state-building. State-
building is a very important and complex topic and remains one of the most crucial issues 
for the international community. The first US commitments to state-building were 
Germany and Japan which stand out as among the few successful examples of what we 
call regime change followed by nation or state-building. Both, Germany and Japan had 
strong bureaucratic institutions, were populated by an educated citizenry, were 
accompanied by strong industrial economies and lived in secular regimes comprised of 
a strong civil society presence. That is why they were so powerful during World War II 
in the first place. However, this is not the case in the 21st century, as most of the war-torn 
countries do not share none of the above-mentioned characteristics, they are mostly 
conservative and authoritarian and lack quality of education and economy. 
 
 
Figure 4: Map of the Fragile States Index, 2017. 
Source: The Fund for Peace. 
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In the 21st century state-building is solely a problem of poor and undeveloped 
nations facing a numerous array of basic challenges such as security, order and economy. 
Such countries are often described in literature as fragile, weak and failed states. A failed 
state is simply the extreme version of a weak state, one in which governmental authority 
effectively collapses, leading to chaos, the rise of local gangs and militias ruling over parts 
of the country, or both.214 Weak and failed states are the source of several problems such 
as terrorism, drugs, human rights abuse and refugee crises. According to the Fragile 
States Index, around one-third of the world is made up of fragile states, majority coming 
from the Middle East and North and Central Africa.215 A weak state is characterized with 
small or no government control which creates serious concerns such as poverty, drugs, 
terrorism, transparency, law and human rights—thus, the formation of proper public 
institutions is very challenging.216 A failed-state is a state that has disintegrated to a point 
of collapse, a state where basic conditions of a government no longer function properly. 
In such societies the standard of living declines to a point where government is ineffective 
to support its citizens and living a normal life becomes impossible. According to the Fund 
for Peace, a failed state is characterized as: loss of control of territory; erosion of legitimate 
authority to make collective decisions; inability to provide public services; and, inability 
to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.217 
When the number of failed states increases, it produces an array of cataclysmic 
events and creates problems for other states and spreads like a virus. The level of 
corruption and crimes increases enormously and it creates the opportunity for non-state 
actors to intervene and for the number of refugees and internally displaced people to rise. 
When a country of millions collapses, that disturbs the regional and international 
economy. People look for a better future and their main destination is usually the West. 
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The West on the other hand is facing numerous problems. Europe for instance, has not 
fully recovered from the financial crisis, its population is declining, people live under the 
danger of terrorist attacks and the wave of far-right populism is on the march. Europe is 
incapable of challenging such obstacles. The US on the other hand, can, but is facing 
enormous encounters. The election of Donald Trump as president has seriously 
undermined the role the US will have in weak and failed states, as he promised to cut 
foreign aid. 
In Afghanistan, the US toppled the Taliban regime, but this did not bring peaceful 
settlement. The Taliban supported by Pakistan managed to create existential challenges; 
thus, the civil war continued. President George W. Bush increased troop numbers up to 
25,000, which were enough to fight the terrorists, but not enough to pacify the country. 
“There was little appetite for nation-building in Afghanistan.”218 By the time President 
Obama became president in 2009, the situation in Afghanistan had worsened even more. 
Although the newly elected President Donald Trump had stated during the Presidential 
campaign that he would withdraw forces from Afghanistan. In 2017, President Trump 
announced a new strategy to continue supporting Afghan government and troops as well 
as deploy more American troops.219  
In Iraq, After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Bush administration based its 
rationale for war on the assertion that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and 
that Saddam Hussein had connections with terrorist organizations and that his 
government posed an immediate threat to the US and its allies. On 29 January 2002, in 
his State of the Union address, President Bush used the term Axis of Evil—a religious 
rhetoric—to describe governments (including Iraq) as supporters of terrorism and 
seeking weapons of mass destruction. However, after the US had invaded Iraq and 
overthrown Saddam Hussein, no weapons of mass destruction were found. President 
George W. Bush signed an agreement with the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki to 
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withdraw the US forces from Iraq by the end of 2011.220 President Barack Obama, soon 
after entering the oval office, accelerated the drawdown of US forces. It became evident 
that Iraq lacked the capacity to maintain order and stability. Terrorist and fundamental 
groups waited until Obama fulfilled his mission. Once the US troops started 
withdrawing, Al-Qaeda regained its strength and spread its influence in Syria and 
evolved into the so-called “Islamic State.”  
In Libya, since the fall of Gaddafi in 2011, violence has been present and the state 
has failed to rebuild institutions. Americans and Europeans brought an end to the 
regime but created other problems. Neither the US nor the EU did nothing to help in 
terms of state-building, on the naïve premise that a new “democratic” government will 
take place and initiate the country’s transformation. President Obama had stated that 
the intervention in Libya was his biggest foreign policy mistake.221 The aftermath of the 
Libyan intervention was a continuous brutal civil war. Peace remains distant. People 
remain divided in political and tribal lines. Moreover, there is a continuous presence of 
Jihadists. Considering such divisions and problems there is a general concern that peace 
and stability might a very long-time. 
In Syria, in early 2012, there was speculation that Assad might be employing 
chemical weapons against the opposition forces in Syria. President Obama publicly stated 
that if Assad were to use chemical weapons it would cross a “red line.”222 A year later, 
the Assad regime did just that. They used Sarin gas and attacked people in Damascus. 
Now, the question was, when would President Obama give the green light to attack. 
Something changed the course of events. On August 29, the British Parliament refused to 
authorize the British government to join a multilateral air campaign that would bomb 
chemical weapons facilities in Syria. From this moment on, President Obama started 
having doubts regarding a potential air attack on Assad forces. Except for the lack of 
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multilateral support—especially Britain—one of the key pillars of Obama foreign policy 
was to reduce the US military presence in the Middle East. Moreover, the domestic 
politics in the US was highly polarized between the Democrats and Republicans. On top 
of that, in Syria, there were many groups fighting each other including the Assad’s 
regime, opposition forces, Al-Nusra, Al-Qaeda, Islamic State and more. It was not clear 
who was fighting whom and if intervention takes place, which groups would take over. 
After a long and devastating war in Iraq and the failure in Libya, the chances of 
intervention in Syria became very low. Simply put, the conditions were enormously 
pessimistic and this hurt Obama’s credibility. Today, while the conflict is continuing and 
there is almost nothing left of Syria, the international community is still debating whether 
to intervene or not. 
In Sudan, the civil war between the two largest ethnic groups—Dinka and Nuer—
led to the killings of two million Sudanese. Since the war broke out in South Sudan in late 
2013, more than 50,000 people have been killed and more than 1.6 million have been 
internally displaced.223 Although an agreement has been reached and the country is 
officially split in two—Sudan (North) and South Sudan—the war produced a fatal 
outcome: two dysfunctional societies. The US was a lead facilitator of South Sudanese 
independence and is accountable for the situation because prior to the outbreak of the 
civil war in 2013, the US strongly supported and advocated for Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement, which became the new country’s government. Both the US and the UN failed 
to stop the ethnic-cleansing.224 Today, both countries are failed states and continue to 
suffer from the most fundamental basic rights such as food and shelter. In order to 
overcome such problems, they need massive support and investment. Moreover, the 
presence of peacekeepers is necessary to preserve security for civilians. 
The intervention in Kosovo is unique compared to the above-mentioned examples. 
Kosovo is in a much better neighborhood and is a European country surrounded by 
European nations. Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is an unstable region filled 
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with sectarianism, authoritarianism and conflicts. In Kosovo, there were no religious 
extremists. The region was and remains homogenous, mostly populated by ethnic 
Albanians and a small Serb minority. The mission was to end ethnic-cleansing and initiate 
a process of state-building. In MENA, countries are much more ethnically diverse and 
when you add religion, it makes the case more complex. In Kosovo, it was clear who 
would be in charge after the War. In MENA, the opposition is fragmented, even if future 
interventions are successful, there is no clear idea who is going to build a functioning 
state. And without knowing who is going to take charge and initiate reforms it is very 
problematic to initiate state-building. Moreover, the size and population of Kosovo is 
very small, this indicates that state-building will be less resources are needed; thus, 
countries are more willing to intervene and help countries without damaging their 
respective economy. Considering all these challenges, it is becoming very difficult to 
initiate state-building, therefore more commitment and resources are needed. 
In today’s world, it is becoming very uncommon for nation-states to solve 
problems unilaterally, whether it’s a terrorist threat, nuclear proliferation, peace-keeping 
mission, environmental degradation or economic crisis. Thus, even the most 
preponderant powers need allies, the US should have a close relationship with its vital 
partner the EU and other democracies worldwide. Whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, 
Sudan, Kosovo, or anywhere else, the US needs credible local and regional partners in 














“Let us break the cycle of violence in Kosovo and build a future for all its children.” 
—Robin Cook, 1999225 
The international community tried a variety of tactics to change Milosevic, but 
when regime transformation failed, regime change followed. Had Milosevic cooperated 
and attempted to relax tensions by listening to Slovenian and Croatian demands and later 
Kosovo’s request for autonomy, Yugoslavia would have probably survived, or, at least, 
Kosovo would have remained under Yugoslavia rule. But, Milosevic refused such 
demands, thus making military action the last available option. After all other options 
had been exhausted and the use of force had become necessary and inevitable, NATO 
succeeded because it could not fail. Failure could have resulted in the dissolution of the 
organization. NATO’s campaign was unique. It was the first sustained use of force by the 
NATO alliance since its establishment in 1949. It was also the first time that force was 
used to enforce UNSC resolutions for the purpose of halting crimes against humanity. 
This victory demonstrated the vitality and cohesiveness of the NATO alliance.226 
Yugoslavia was a test for NATO’s role in post-Cold War Europe and Kosovo was a 
milestone in the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Without the US commitment and 
determined efforts, Milosevic would have maintained his rule on Kosovo. Thus, Kosovo 
is a great story of American leadership, Western cooperation and humanitarian 
intervention. 
It is important to note that NATO and Kosovo Albanians got lucky. Had 
Milosevic’s strategy on Kosovo been more brutal, for example similar to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, or had food supplies not held up for thousands of civilians living in 
outdoor in the forests and hills, the number of casualties might have been higher, and 
NATO air campaign strategy would have been impossible to save them. Goliath 
(Milosevic) had some good advantages but David (NATO) prevailed at the end. NATO’s 
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superior military would have been decisive and won the war, but considering the high 
number of casualties it would have been a Pyrrhic victory.227 
With intervention comes responsibility. When a regime toppled, it takes 
significant amounts of energy and resources to build or rebuild a state. Sustainable peace 
requires local partners with the capacity to govern and the integrity to lead. State-
building requires time and substance and most importantly, it requires an enduring 
commitment. International cooperation is critical in order to overcome post-conflict 
challenges. Providing humanitarian assistance, security and civil administration were 
key in establishing a peaceful environment in Kosovo. Unlike Bosnia, Kosovo had no 
institutions; thus, it was easier for the international community to maintain peace, 
because KFOR and UNMIK cooperated with each other. UNMIK helped through well-
qualified staff members who assisted the local civil servants—something the US failed to 
do in Iraq. Within years, UNMIK was capable of creating working institutions—in three 
years Kosovo had a fiscal policy, tax system and government. During the same time 
period, KFOR constantly provided professional and military assistance to the ad hoc 
Kosovo Protection Corps, which today is known as the Kosovo Security Force.  
ICTY officially closed in 2017. Although it left behind a mixed record, it convicted 
161 individuals and sentenced 90 of them, including Slobodan Milosevic who died in 
prison, Ratko Mladic with life imprisonment and Radovan Karadzic with 40 years’ 
imprisonment.228  Most importantly, the court has given the opportunity to thousands of 
victims and witnesses to tell their stories and testify at court. The court could have 
achieved more; however, it leaves a powerful legacy of war crimes justice. Ironically, the 
court closed with a final judgment against Slobodan Praljak—a Croat—who drank poison 
after the court rejected his appeal and passed away after a couple of hours at the hospital. 
In 1992, Francis Fukuyama had predicted that Yugoslavia would neither be 
peaceful nor democratic “any time in the near future” and that it would turn out to be 
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“just as dangerous to existing Western democracies as the old Soviet Union was.”229 
While there is no objective definition of what the “near future” truly means, we can surely 
argue that the region is much better off now than it used to be. Although it is lacking 
behind in many areas, the Balkan region is in the process of transformation. Today, it 
consists of democracies, some admittedly flawed (semi-democratic, semi-authoritarian), 
but there is no authoritarian government and that is certainly progress. Today, Kosovo 
has a developing economy and a flawed state beset with serious socio-political problems. 
However, Kosovars are far better off than they were under Serbia’s rule. The fight for 
liberation and its emergence as an independent and sovereign state is an accomplishment 
of its people at home and of the US and its allies abroad. 
Although Kosovo’s political status remains unresolved, its main problem is the 
inability of the government to provide efficient public services and to interact with other 
states, mainly due to its lack of diplomatic recognition and membership in international 
organizations. Building efficient institutions is a key feature of a state. But institution-
building takes time. The current emphasis on state-building would have never happened 
without the US commitment and people of Kosovo are aware of that. Indeed, Kosovo sees 
the US diplomatic, political and military power as the main defender of its independence. 
As a result, Kosovo maintains an unquestioned supporter of the US. According to a 
Gallup’s yearly leadership reports, Kosovo’s support for the US is first in the world. 
Kosovo remains a European problem. The effectiveness of the EU policy will 
depend on the carrots it can promise to Kosovo and Serbia in order to gain future 
concessions. The Serbian foreign policy has been “all in one: Kosovo, Russia and Europe,” 
but the problem is that they can only have only one of the last two. Promising faster EU 
integration is undoubtedly a good incentive, but it is up to Serbia to choose. Kosovo, on 
the other hand, has no other option but the West. Kosovo remains an unfinished state 
and its legitimacy is contested. Two permanent UNSC members, China and Russia, still 
do not recognize Kosovo as an independent country.  But, Kosovo is not a geo-strategic 
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concern for either of them and therefore the recognition of Kosovo depends primarily on 
their relationship with the West. In the end, the transformation of Kosovo as a full 
member of international community is highly dependent on the West. The West freed 
Kosovo from torture, tyranny and terror and helped establish the foundation of 
statehood. The West should close the last chapter of Kosovo by allowing the newest 
country in Europe to go forward as part of the European and international community. 
There are only two alternatives for Kosovo: full integration into the EU or the swap of 
territories with Serbia. The first option is the ideal solution whereas the creation of mono-
ethnic borders would so against the core values of the EU and only bring destruction and 
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1389—The Battle of Kosovo: Balkan allies led by the Serbian Prince, Lazar organize a 
military campaign against the invading forces of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans 
win the battle, following a five century Ottoman rule in the Balkans. 
1912—First Balkan War: Balkan ethnic groups struggle for establishing the nation-state. 
Four Balkan states: Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro form an alliance and 
defeat the Ottomans.  
1913—Second Balkan War: Bulgaria attempts to annex Macedonia but fails. Greece, 
Serbia, Turkey and Romania attack Bulgaria. As a result, Bulgaria loses territory. 
1918—Annexation of Kosovo: The Kingdom of Serbia annexes Kosovo.  
1919—Kingdom of Yugoslavia: The Kingdom of Serbia transforms into the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In 1929, the kingdom is renamed: Kingdom of Yugoslavia. 
1946—Republic of Yugoslavia: In 1945 the monarchy is abolished. Next year, the entity 
is renamed the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1963 the country is renamed 
again as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
1974—Kosovo Autonomy: The new constitution of Yugoslavia grants Kosovo major 
autonomy. 
1989—Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution: Milosevic consolidates his power through 
centralization and revokes Kosovo’s autonomy. 
1991—Third Balkan War: The disintegration of Yugoslavia begins. Slovenia and Croatia 
declare independence, marking the beginning of a bloody war with Serbia. 
1995—Srebrenica Genocide: The Serb forces slaughter 8,373 Bosniak men and boys. 
1998—Kosovo War: Armed conflicts between the Serb police and Kosovo Liberation 
Army intensify. 
1999—Rambouillet Conference: NATO proposes a peace agreement between the 
Albanian representatives of Kosovo and Yugoslavia. 
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1999—NATO Intervention: NATO launches the air campaign against Yugoslavia. 
2004—Kosovo March Riots: Kosovo witnesses the largest ethnic violent incident 
between Albanians and Serbs since the end of the war. 
2007—Marti Ahtisaari Plan: Unveils a plan to set Kosovo on a path to independence, 
which is immediately welcomed by Kosovo Albanians and rejected by Serbia. 
2008—Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: Kosovo declares independence and 
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